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I. INTRODUCTION+
A. Assumptions of a Spectrum Crunch
It is now taken almost as a matter of faith among telecommunications professionals that there is a “spectrum crunch”1 precipitated by ever-growing demand for mobile broadband.2 This, in turn, has driven a strong policy consen*
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1
See, e.g., Spectrum Crunch, FCC, http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/spectrum-crunch
(last visited May 05, 2015).
2
This paper uses “mobile broadband” to refer to wireless data access over facilitiesbased mobile network operator (MNO) infrastructure. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT AND ANALYSIS OF COMPETITIVE MARKET CONDITIONS WITH RESPECT TO MOBILE
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sus among industry and policymakers for the U.S. federal government to actively make available to mobile network operators (MNOs) vast new swathes
of spectral resources via exclusive-use licenses.3 In the National Broadband
Plan, for example, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) argued
that “[t]he growth of wireless broadband will be constrained if government
does not make spectrum available to enable network expansion and technology
upgrades.”4 The White House has taken up this cause as well, issuing a memorandum calling for 500 MHz of new spectrum to be made available for mobile
and wireless broadband by 20205 and making new spectrum resources central
to policies supporting “everything from smart phones to wireless broadband
connectivity for laptops to new forms of machine-to-machine communication
within a decade.”6 Similar efforts to free up spectrum for mobile broadband are
taking place across the globe.7
It is indisputable that mobile connectivity, driven by new technological developments in materials, miniaturization, and computing, has increased dramatically around the world and radically transformed economic and social
life.8 Both mobile subscriptions and the amount of data traversing mobile networks has increased substantially in the past several years; by the end of 2014,
WIRELESS, INCLUDING COMMERCIAL MOBILE SERVICES 39, 42 (2013), available at
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-13-34A1.pdf.
3
See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND
PLAN xii (2010), available at http://download.broadband.gov/plan/national-broadbandplan.pdf.
4
See id. at 77.
5
See The White House, Memorandum from the White House on Unleashing the Wireless Broadband Revolution, for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (2010),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/presidential-memorandumunleashing-wireless-broadband-revolution. These are based on FCC recommendations. Fed.
Commc’ns Comm’n, supra note 3, at 84.
6
Office of the Press Sec’y, President Obama Details Plan to Win the Future through
Expanded
Wireless
Access,
THE
WHITE
HOUSE
(Feb.
10,
2011),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/02/10/president-obama-details-plan-winfuture-through-expanded-wireless-access.
7
See Frank Swain, Will We Ever... Face a Wireless ‘Spectrum Crunch’?, BBC (Oct.
15, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20131014-are-we-headed-for-wireless-chaos
(noting that “[m]any governments, then, are looking for ways to alleviate the [spectrum
crunch] problem before the wireless signal to our electronic devices starts failing. So far, the
principle strategy has been to find more spectrum”).
8
See DELOITTE, WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF MOBILE TELEPHONY ON ECONOMIC GROWTH? A
REPORT
FOR
THE
GSM
ASSOCIATION
2
(2012),
available
at
http://www.gsma.com/publicpolicy/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/gsma-deloitte-impactmobile-telephony-economic-growth.pdf; MANUEL CASTELLS ET AL., THE MOBILE COMMUNICATION SOCIETY: A CROSS-CULTURAL ANALYSIS OF AVAILABLE EVIDENCE ON THE SOCIAL USES
OF
WIRELESS
COMMUNICATION
TECHNOLOGY
238-249 (2004), available at
http://hack.tion.free.fr/textes/MobileCommunicationSociety.pdf.
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there were an estimated 2.3 billion mobile broadband subscriptions globally,
almost five times as many as in 2008.9
At the same time, decisions about spectrum should not and cannot be made
lightly due to the physically limited nature of spectrum and the corresponding
strong public interest in efficient spectrum allocation.10 Regulators must consider social, equity, public safety, environmental, and other factors in addition
to economic impacts when determining whether and how to repurpose spectrum. Furthermore, freeing up “new” spectrum is only one of several mechanisms for dealing with increasing mobile demand, and exclusive-use licenses
are one among many different management options for spectrum bands.11 Although conventional spectrum wisdom highlights making new exclusive-use
allocations available to MNOs, this may not be the most efficient or socially
beneficial decision in all cases. It is exactly these kinds of concerns that led to
calls in the National Broadband Plan for the U.S. government to make spectrum allocation and licensing data more accessible, as the “complexity of the
[existing] system and the resulting lack of transparency and usability create
impediments to public policy and limit the emergence of new technologies that
could employ such data to optimize use of the spectrum automatically.”12
In this paper, we examine the provenance, reliability, and uses of mobile
demand forecasts and find that several highly visible spectrum demand estimates over the past several years have exceeded actual traffic, which may have
biased spectrum allocation decisions and policies in socially suboptimal
ways. 13 These reports include Cisco Visual Networking Index (VNI) esti9
INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, THE WORLD IN 2014: ICT FACTS AND FIGURES (2014),
available at http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Documents/facts/ICTFactsFigures2014e.pdf (charting growth from 2007 to 2014 of mobile broadband and all mobile subscriptions,
respectively).
10 See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (noting “certain basic
facts about radio as a means of communication—its facilities are limited; they are not available to all who may wish to use them; the radio spectrum simply is not large enough to accommodate everybody”).
11 See Jon M. Peha, Sharing Spectrum Through Spectrum Policy Reform and Cognitive
Radio, 97 Proc. of the IEEE 708, 710-16 (2009); Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Spectrum Policy
Task Force, Report of the Spectrum Rights and Responsibilities Working Group 2 (2002)
available
at
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:3Vmxfxyxo4wJ:www.fcc.gov/sptf/
files/SRRWGFinalReport.doc+&cd=5&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us (describing alternative models).
12 Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, supra note 3, at 80.
13 George S. Ford correctly points out that data “demand,” in its economic sense, is
difficult or impossible to measure directly and will always be higher than actual traffic due
to carrier adjustments in the face of spectral congestion, including changes in pricing or
technology. See George S. Ford, Have We Got it All Wrong? Forecasting Mobile Data Use
and Spectrum Exhaust, PHOENIX CENTER FOR ADVANCED LEGAL & ECON. PUB. POL’Y STUD.
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mates,14 which are commonly cited in government and industry reports, including the National Broadband Plan, as well as estimates endorsed in ITU’s
WRC-07. We explore potential technological, economic, and sociological factors that may drive these biases, as well as possible solutions and policy remedies. This paper is not meant to imply any deliberate misrepresentation from
any party, although this is certainly possible when billions of dollars are at
stake, as with spectrum policy. Rather, the paper investigates various potential
sources of bias and methods to mitigate such risks, in the hopes that it might
inform businesses, regulators, and the general public about how to better allocate and manage finite spectrum resources.
Neither does this analysis imply that making any new, exclusive-use available for mobile broadband is the suboptimal policy decision. In the near future,
such reallocations provide benefits to both MNOs and the general public
through deficit reduction and economic multipliers.15 Rather, it suggests additional caution and scrutiny are warranted for long-term spectrum policy decisions, rather than a blind faith about ever-increasing mobile data demand. In
these cases, especially, policymakers should push for new, higher quality data
before committing to long-term policies as well as favor flexibility and reversibility in their decision-making.
B. The Importance of Data Provenance in Policy: Lessons from Intellectual
Property Debates
The issue of unreliable data taking “a life of its own” is not just a theoretical
one.16 The history of intellectual property policy in the United States provides
one telling example of how data with uncertain provenance can become well-

2 (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.phoenix-center.org/perspectives/Perspective14-06Final.pdf.
As argued in greater detail later, in this paper we typically interpret mobile demand forecasts as forecasts of actual data traffic, since these forecasts typically incorporate supplyside and pricing adjustments into their calculations.
14 See CISCO, CISCO VISUAL NETWORKING INDEX: GLOBAL MOBILE DATA TRAFFIC FORECAST
UPDATE
2014-2019
(2015),
available
at
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/service-provider/visual-networking-indexvni/white_paper_c11-520862.pdf.
15 Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: Doubling the Amount of Commercial Spectrum
to Unleash the Innovative Potential of Wireless Broadband, THE WHITE HOUSE (June 28,
2010),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/fact-sheet-doubling-amountcommercial-spectrum-unleash-innovative-potential-wireless.
16 See, e.g., Julian Sanchez, 750,000 Lost Jobs? The Dodgy Digits Behind the War in
Piracy, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 8, 2008, 11:30 PM), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2008/10/dodgy-digits-behind-the-war-on-piracy (describing the misrepresentation of
job numbers lost to piracy stemming from unreliable data).
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established, and then exert an influence on policy.17 In particular, for much of
the prior decade, advocates of strong IP protections emphasized data claiming
that 750,000 U.S. jobs have been lost to IP theft and that IP infringement cost
the U.S. economy $200 to $250 billion each year.18 These figures were then
routinely cited by the U.S. Customs & Border Patrol (CPB), Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), and Federal Trade Commission (FTC),19 even though investigative analysis revealed that there was “no good reason to think that either
[figure] is remotely reliable.”20 Yet such figures, bolstered in part by industry
groups that had a vested financial interest in claiming significant losses, became a primary input into calls for legislation strengthening intellectual property rights.21 Although it is impossible to precisely trace the impact of these
figures on the strong IP protections passed or proposed in recent years, the
numbers were repeatedly cited in IP policy debates, including, for example,
around the PRO-IP Act,22 which was passed in 2008.23
The history of these numbers provides four important lessons regarding the
origin and use of empirical analysis in policy debates. First, a source that is
unreliable or only partially addresses a specific issue can become a “reliable”
fact if it is repeated enough and its origin becomes obfuscated.24 More precisely, over time, such data gain reliability when qualifiers and nuance that accompanied the original reports are dropped, as well as by association with large,
well-known organizations that lend the figures their institutional credibility.25
For example, the 750,000 job-loss figure was originally the upper end of a
broad estimate, but over time that range, and even the “up to,” qualifier, disappeared.26 Both figures were commonly referenced by industry and government
sources in part because of their use by credible government agencies.27 Second,
industry groups and associations, to the extent that skewed numbers might
provide financial gains or policy leverage, can assist this process by repeating
Id.
Id.
19 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-423, OBSERVATIONS ON EFFORTS TO
QUANTIFY THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COUNTERFEIT AND PIRATED GOODS 19 (2010).
20 Sanchez, supra note 16.
21 Id.
22 H.R. 4279, 110th Cong. (2008).
23 Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-403, 122 Stat. 425 (to be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 17 U.S.C., and
18 U.S.C.).
24 See Sanchez, supra note 16 (describing several sources for a jobs figure that was
repeated over a series of years).
25 See id. (stating that the jobs figure was repeated by the United States Customs and
Border Patrol).
26 Id.
27 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 19, at 18.
17
18
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the numbers or obscuring their origin.28 Third, the government is willing to use
data with unclear provenance in policy decisions, in part due to the ways in
which unreliability becomes obscured over time.29 And finally, once a figure
becomes established, it can persist for a long time; the 750,000 figure traced
back nearly a quarter-century30 before some government sources stopped relying on it, and even then “[t]hese estimates attributed to FBI, CBP, and FTC
continue to be referenced by various industry and government sources as evidence of the significance of the counterfeiting and piracy problem to the U.S.
economy.”31
The IP debate is not, nor is intended to serve, as a perfect analogy to spectrum demand forecasts. In the case of IP, estimates revolved around economic
costs, not future demand.32 Moreover, wireless demand figures are regularly
and reliably updated, and there are a greater number of forecasters.33 However,
the underlying dynamics surrounding how data provenance can be obscured in
policy debates contain several similarities, and we find evidence of all four of
these factors in spectrum policy.
C. Spectrum Forecasts Have Been Important Determinants of National Policy
Like IP policy, in the U.S., outside data with unclear reliability have been
key inputs into national spectrum policies. In the U.S., for example, spectrum
forecasts are routinely cited in national policy decisions about the allocation of
wireless frequencies.34 Former Commission Chairman Julius Genachowski has
referenced Cisco projections in justifying clearing 500 MHz of spectrum and
28 See Sanchez, supra note 16 (citing both the FBI and International Anti-Counterfeiting
Coalition as organizations that quote the figure).
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 19.
32 See Sanchez, supra note 16.
33 See, e.g., CISCO, supra note 14, at 1 (“Global mobile data grew 69 percent in 2014.”);
see also ERICSSON, ERICSSON MOBILITY REPORT 3 (2014), available at
http://www.ericsson.com/res/docs/2014/ericsson-mobility-report-november-2014.pdf (stating that “60 percent growth in mobile data traffic” for the year between Q3 2013 and Q3
2014).
34 See In the Matter of Amendment of the Commission’s Rules with Regard to Commercial Operations in the 1695-1710 MHz, 1755-1780 MHz, and 2155-2180 MHz Bands, Report and Order, GN Docket No. 13-185, 29 FCC Rcd 4610, para. 3 (Mar. 31, 2014) (“The
demand for spectrum…is expected to continue increasing” and the FCC is continuing to
“make available additional licensed and unlicensed spectrum to meet this growing demand”); FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, FCC STAFF TECHNICAL PAPER: MOBILE BROADBAND:
THE BENEFITS OF ADDITIONAL SPECTRUM 9 Exhibit 4 (2010), available at
http://download.broadband.gov/plan/fcc-staff-technical-paper-mobile-broadband-benefitsof-additional-spectrum.pdf; FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 3, at 84.
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warned that “we should remember that the clock won’t stop in 2020, and data
demand will continue to increase.”35 As recently as August 1, 2014, FCC experts emphasized that “[c]onsumer demand is exploding, data usage is growing
exponentially, and faster 4G networks enable even more data services.” 36
MNOs, citing increasing demand for their services, have with great success
argued that they need additional spectrum to expand and improve their networks; for example, CTIA cites both Cisco and ITU in arguing that without
additional spectrum, the wireless industry will face a “crisis.”37
Regulators face complex decisions in how to manage and allocate spectrum
bands. Economists argue that the overall value to society through increased
economic efficiency brought by new communication services is several multiples of the value to the spectrum license holder, as reflected in their bids for
exclusive-use licenses.38 However, in some cases, shared spectrum management plans facilitate device and application innovation that can also generate
significant social and economic value. This may be the case even when access
rights are open to all qualified users and are not auctioned.39 The most notable
example is the 2.4 GHz ISM band that supports significant Wi-Fi, Bluetooth,
and other unlicensed uses. For certain applications—including certain types of
intensive wireless data transmission—such unlicensed bands can be significantly more efficient means for wireless data transfer than potential alternatives.40 Moreover, additional social benefits to using spectrum, such as improvements to public safety, quality of life, and national defense, are difficult
35 Julius Genachowski, Chairman, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Winning the Global Race:
Opportunities and Challenges for Mobile Broadband, Address at the University of Pennsylvania
–
Wharton
(Oct.
4,
2012),
available
at
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-316661A1.pdf.
36 Roger C. Sherman, Empowering Small Businesses, OFFICIAL FCC BLOG (Aug. 1,
2014, 10:01 AM), https://www.fcc.gov/blog/empowering-small-businesses.
37 John Marinho, It is No Trick – There is a Spectrum Crisis, CTIA – THE WIRELESS
ASS’N BLOG (Oct. 23, 2012), http://blog.ctia.org/2012/10/23/it-is-no-trick-there-is-aspectrum-crisis.
38 See, e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett & Roberto E. Munoz, A Welfare Analysis of Spectrum
Allocation Policies 2 (George Mason Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper
No. 06-28, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=908717 (arguing that total social
welfare benefits produced in public spectrum auctions are dominant over auction revenues).
39 See PAUL MILGROM, JONATHAN LEVIN & ASSAD EILAT, THE CASE FOR UNLICENSED
SPECTRUM
16-19,
¶¶
42-49
(2011),
available
at
http://siepr.stanford.edu/?q=/system/files/shared/pubs/papers/pdf/10036_Paper_Milgrom.pd
f (estimating that Wi-Fi creates $25 billion in the economic value of mobile data traffic, $12
billion in the economic value of mobile data speed, and a possible $15 billion in the economic value of Wi-Fi only peripherals).
40 See id. at 9, ¶ 24 (2011) (noting that unlicensed Wi-Fi spectrum allows “devices to
make intensive use of spectrum by reusing spectrum many times, but compared to cellular
networks, its much smaller transmission radius allows much more reuse”).
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to quantify or allocate using market demand-based methods and require regulators to make value judgments about the importance of various services.41 To
accommodate and balance these various sources of demand, regulators rely on
projections of the future types and intensity of wireless usage, among other
inputs.42
For these reasons, when spectrum demand forecasts are inaccurate, governments may make suboptimal policy decisions. Overestimating the growth of
mobile network traffic and focusing on exclusive-use licenses, for example,
can crowd out other types of wireless communication by increasing spectrum
scarcity.43 This directly hinders wireless innovation by raising the entry costs
for new applications or services that require spectrum access.44 Thus, communications services that might offer greater overall social benefit—by, for example, offering cheaper service at reduced, but acceptable, quality of service—
may be shortchanged.45 Due to the ubiquitous nature of wireless communication, this effect may be felt throughout the economy as well as in a range of
government activities, from law enforcement to defense.46

41 See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 11, at 4
(discussing several important services that market-based methods might disrupt).
42 See, e.g., Report and Order, supra note 34 (“The demand for spectrum…is expected
to continue increasing” and the FCC is continuing to “make available additional licensed
and unlicensed spectrum to meet this growing demand”); FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra
note 34, at 9, Exhibit 4; FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 3, at 84; REAL WIRELESS,
STUDY ON THE FUTURE UK SPECTRUM DEMAND FOR TERRESTRIAL MOBILE BROADBAND APPLICATIONS
i,
iii
(2014),
available
at
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/cfi-mobilebb/annexes/RW_report.pdf.
43 See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 11, at 7.
44 See MARTIN COOPER, THE MYTH OF SPECTRUM SCARCITY: WHY SHUFFLING EXISTING
SPECTRUM AMONG USERS WILL NOT SOLVE AMERICA’S WIRELESS BROADBAND CHALLENGE
5
(2010),
available
at
http://dynallc.com/wpcontent/uploads/2012/12/themythofspectrumscarcity.pdf; cf. JOHN M. CHAPIN & WILLIAM H.
LEHR, MASS. INST. OF TECH., MOBILE BROADBAND GROWTH, SPECTRUM SCARCITY AND SUSTAINABLE COMPETITION 22 (2011), available at http://people.csail.mit.edu/wlehr/LehrPapers_files/chapin_lehr_tprc2011%20mobile%20broadband.pdf (noting that dedicated
unlicensed spectrum supports competition and innovation in new applications and services).
45 See CHAPIN & LEHR, supra note 44, at 5-6 (noting that when facilities-based operators
lack additional spectrum, they must resort to cell-splitting at higher infrastructure costs per
square kilometer; this leads to a concentrated market where most firms will “either exit the
market or be reduced to niche competitors that offer lower-quality discount services”).
46 See Jessica Rosenworcel, A Federal Wireless Policy Built on Carrots, Not Sticks, THE
HILL CONGRESS BLOG (June 17, 2013, 1:30 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congressblog/technology/308011-a-federal-wireless-policy-built-on-carrots-not-sticks.
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D. Demand Forecasts Affect Network and Capital Investment
Like regulators, those investing in wireless services also use spectrum demand estimates to make long-lasting decisions about billions of dollars of capital.47 Wireless operators, for example, have several means of dealing with increasing demand in addition to obtaining new spectrum. These include splitting
cell sites or increasing deployment of small cells (densification),48 upgrading to
LTE or other more efficient technologies (including refarming of spectrum
bands dedicated to less efficient transmission technologies),49 improving offloading techniques, 50 or using financial incentives to adjust customer demand.51 However, when national regulators emphasize clearing new spectrum,
investing in new spectrum licenses is more likely to become the most economical means for managing demand, and MNOs are therefore less likely to invest
in physical infrastructure even when this might be the most socially beneficial
outcome.52
Demand estimates also drive outside investment decisions. When future estimates of wireless demand are high, investors are more likely to invest in such
businesses, typically at the expense of investing in other areas of the economy
or into different technologies.53 Demand estimates that are not accurate can
therefore hurt the efficient allocation of the larger economy by incentivizing
47 See Thomas Gryta, A Gold Rush Hits Wireless Spectrum, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 10, 2013,
7:51
PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303330204579248041603159658 (noting
that Verizon Wireless purchased $3.9 billion of spectrum, and AT&T purchased a rival for
$1.2 billion “largely to take over its rights to use the airwaves” in order to keep up with the
demand for spectrum); BROAD. CABLE FIN. MGMT. ASS’N, UNDERSTANDING BROADCAST
AND CABLE FINANCE 29 (2013) (noting that FCC licenses are generally treated as indefinitely lived intangible assets).
48 10
Ways to Deal with Mobile Data Capacity Crunch, AMDOCS 3,
http://www.amdocs.com/Whitepapers/OSS/WhitePaper-MobileDataCapacityCrunch.pdf
(last visited Mar. 07, 2015) (noting that service providers can spatially separate the transmissions from each cell site, install additional carriers per cell site, or roll out additional
macro cell sites to deal with the mobile data capacity crunch).
49 Dan Hays et al., Solving the Spectrum Crunch: Reduce, Reuse, Recycle, 18 COMM.
REV. 12, 19 (2013).
50 See 10 Ways to Deal with Mobile Data Capacity Crunch, supra note 48, at 4-5 (noting that “dramatic capacity increase” can be made by offloading mobile data to Wi-Fi and
femtocells).
51 See DAN HAYS ET AL., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, THREE WAYS MOBILE OPERATORS
CAN (PROFITABLY) HELP CUSTOMERS SELF-MANAGE DATA CONSUMPTION (2013), available
at
http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/industry/communications/publications/assets/pwcmobile-operators-help-customers-self-manage-data.pdf; Ford, supra note 13, at 4.
52 See FED. COMMN’CS COMM’N, supra note 34, at 7 (noting that additional spectrum is
an economic substitute for additional network investment).
53 See Hays et al., supra note 49, at 14.
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over- or under-investment in communications-related enterprises vis-à-vis other areas of the economy. Overestimates may also cause investors to overpay
for wireless assets.54 As this over-allocation becomes apparent, prices typically
drop and the industry must downsize or correct.55 This creates unnecessary volatility and may drive away future investments.56 For example, “wildly optimistic” predictions in the 1990s that Internet traffic was doubling every three
months57—driven in part by “false” Internet traffic reports from Worldcom58 —
led to overinvestment in fiber optic capacity and the subsequent bankruptcy of
many wireline infrastructure companies. As with IP figures, the Worldcom
reports were routinely cited by government officials and business reporters
despite “a lack of hard data” to substantiate them, being lent an “air of credibility” due to the proprietary nature of Internet traffic volumes and Worldcom’s
unique position at the time to monitor such information.59
E. Spectrum Forecasts Should Have a High Burden of Proof
In general, getting spectrum policy right is even more important than pure
economic factors would indicate, for at least four major reasons. First, unlike
most other resources, the electromagnetic spectrum, by its very nature, is a
physically limited resource; no new frequencies can ever be created or destroyed. 60 In general, this means that once spectrum is allocated to one set of
54 See id. (noting how mobile-data use has become “indoor and nomadic – after many
operators have invested steeply in outdoor coverage, capacity, and poorly propagating spectrum”).
55 Once the industry realizes the spectrum has been over-allocated, demand will drop,
and the law of demand states that prices will also drop. See David R. Henderson, Demand,
in
THE
CONCISE
ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF
ECON.
(2008),
available
at
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Demand.html.
56 Cf. Ian Huntsley, Investment Strategies for Volatile Markets, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/trading/08/strategies-for-volatile-market.asp
(last
visited Feb. 25, 2015) (noting that as volatility rises, investors face a rise in risk of loss,
therefore driving away investors).
57 Yochi J. Dreazen, Wildly Optimistic Data Drove Telecoms to Build Fiber Glut, WALL
ST. J. (Sept. 26, 2002, 3:38 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1032982764442483713.
58 J. Gregory Sidak, The Failure of Good Intentions: The WorldCom Fraud and the
Collapse of American Telecommunications After Deregulation, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 207, 228
(2003).
59 Id.; ANDREW ODLYZKO, AT&T LABS RESEARCH, INTERNET GROWTH: MYTH, REALITY,
AND ABUSE, available at http://www.dtc.umn.edu/~odlyzko/doc/internet.growth.myth.pdf.
60 Historically, in the long-run, technology improvements have greatly increased the
range of usable frequencies for wireless communication. See Kevin Werbach & Aalok Mehta, The Spectrum Opportunity: Sharing as the Solution to the Wireless Crunch, 8 INT’L J.
COMM. 133, 140 (2014). However, we do not consider such frequency expansions in this
paper since the timing of such improvements is uncertain and is generally beyond the planning range of most business and policy decisions. See, e.g., Dan Hays et al., supra note 49,
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users, it is not available for alternative applications or technologies.61 This finite nature of spectrum allocation, in fact, drives much of modern communications policy.62
This aspect of spectrum also strongly distinguishes wireless industries from
their wireline counterparts.63 In wireline industries, expansion of, say, fiberoptic backbones—even when this requires access to public resources such as
rights-of-way—does not generally crowd out the ability of competing companies or applications to deploy their own infrastructure.64 Thus, both the Commission and courts have acknowledged the existence and importance of a “virtuous cycle of innovation” for wireline broadband, in which excess bandwidth
drives novel application development, which in turn pushes additional network
expansion.65 Such dynamism is problematic in wireless industries, where overinvestment may stifle, rather than encourage, overall application development
by reducing spectrum availability for alternative uses.66 This can lower overall
social welfare. Self-fulfilling prophecies, in which expectations about behavior
at 13.
61 See, e.g., Dan Hays et al., supra note 49, at 15 (noting that incumbent licensees of
desirable spectrum are unlikely to “vacate prime holdings due to the lack of alternatives”);
Thomas W. Hazlett & Evan T. Leo, The Case for Liberal Spectrum Licenses: A Technical
and Economic Perspective, 26 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 1037, 1053 (2011) (noting that
“[a]llocating spectrum for unlicensed usage necessarily excludes certain wireless alternatives”).
62 See ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 38 (1983); see also Nat’l
Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
63 See Chapter VI – Setting the Predicates: Communications Architecture Today and
Tomorrow, THE ASPEN INST., http://csreports.aspeninstitute.org/Roundtable-on-SpectrumPolicy/2013/report/details/0075/Spectrum (last visited Mar. 07, 2015).
64 Many companies, for example, are simultaneously able to make use of utility poles to
deploy wireline infrastructure, and the FCC has authority to regulate rates, terms, and conditions for pole attachments to “provide that such rates, terms, and conditions are just and
reasonable.” See 47 U.S.C. § 224(b)(1) (2012); see also FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra
note 3, at 109.
65 See Preserving the Open Internet, Report & Order, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905 at paras. 3,
38 (2010); Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 634 (2014).
66 This is best exemplified by the largely irreversible decision to allocate a frequency
band as either licensed or unlicensed use. See Coleman Bazelon, Licensed or unlicensed:
The economic considerations in incremental spectrum allocations, 47 IEEE COMM. MAG.
110, 110 (2009) (noting that there currently is no way to trade spectrum between licensed
and unlicensed uses); MILGROM ET AL., supra note 39, at 2, ¶ 5 (noting that unlicensed use
offers lower barriers to entry due to freedom from the need to negotiate with exclusive license holders); William H. Lehr, The Role of Unlicensed in Spectrum Reform, in INTERNET
POLICY AND ECONOMICS 169, 174 (William H. Lehr & Lorenzo Maria Pupillo eds., 2d ed.
2009), noting that flexible licensing favors network-centric service providers while unlicensed favors an equipment-centric end-user model); Hazlett & Leo, supra note 61 (noting
that “[a]llocating spectrum for unlicensed usage necessarily excludes certain wireless alternatives”).
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propel that very behavior, as seen with Moore’s law, 67 are therefore problematic in a wireless context.
Second, spectrum is a public resource that is “owned” by a nation’s citizenry.68 As such, its exploitation carries a much stronger consideration of public
welfare than many other resources; spectrum managers are obliged to balance
the needs of scientific, non-commercial, and amateur users, as well as considerations of free speech, public safety, the national defense, and equity.69 Any
use of exclusive-use licenses, to the extent that they completely block off a
spectrum band from public or government access for the length of the license,
therefore should face an extremely strong burden of proof from a public policy
perspective.
Third, decisions about spectrum have longer time-scales and less reversibility than many other areas of policy.70 Moving incumbent users off spectrum
bands in response to technological or economic changes, for example, is generally time-consuming, expensive, and contentious, often taking billions of
dollars of upfront investment to facilitate relocation and more than a decade to
complete.71 This arises in part because wireless industries are characterized by
high up-front capital costs and generally need to meet minimum coverage areas
and densities for business or licensing reasons.72 Moreover, the potential uses
of a particular band of spectrum are often limited by physical constraints and
interference from adjacent users, requiring regulators to explicitly pre-judge
the potential applications of a spectrum band to maximize overall usage.73 Un67 CORNELIUS DISCO
GETHER 206-07 (1998).

& BAREND

VAN DER

MEULEN, GETTING

NEW TECHNOLOGIES TO-

68 See Christian A. Herter, The Electromagnetic Spectrum: A Critical Natural Resource,
25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 651, 655 (1985) (noting spectrum is a natural resource and that generally, natural resources within the geographic boundaries of a nation are owned by that
nation); see generally J. Armand Musey, Broadcasting Licenses: Ownership Rights and the
Spectrum Rationalization Challenge, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. (2012) (discussing the
quasi-property nature of spectrum licenses).
69 The FCC, for example, must determine “whether the public interest, convenience, and
necessity will be served by the granting of” a spectrum license. See § 309(a); see also FED.
COMMN’CS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 7, 40, 53.
70 See FED. COMMN’CS COMM’N, supra note 3, at 78, 79.
71 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-472, REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE
OF THE ARMED SERVICES, U.S. SENATE: SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT: FEDERAL RELOCATION
COSTS AND AUCTION REVENUES 2, 3 (2013); see FED. COMMN’CS COMM’N, supra note 3, at
79 (noting historical time lags of between 6 and 13 years for reallocating spectrum).
72 See Spectrum Management: FCC’s Use and Management of Buildout Requirements:
What GAO Found, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14236 (last visited Mar. 07, 2015).
73 See, e.g., Hazlett & Leo, supra note 61; see also GREGORY L. ROSSTON, STANFORD
INST. FOR ECON. POLICY RESEARCH, INCREASING THE EFFICIENCY OF SPECTRUM ALLOCATION
1, n. 2 (2014).
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der many licensing regimes, incumbent wireless users also have little incentive
to deploy future-proof receiver or transmitter technology even if marginal costs
are low, and may also have the political power to stifle or slow down relocations in many cases (such as when adjacent incumbent GPS users successfully
prevented LightSquared from launching a wholesale mobile network).74 This
process has become even more difficult now that most lightly-used bands have
already been cleared and reallocated.75
Fourth, carriers have alternatives to additional spectrum for managing traffic
demand, for both short- and long-term timescales. The amount of traffic a given amount of spectrum can handle is somewhat flexible. For example, wireless
carriers can deploy additional cell sites to “densify” their networks or upgrade
to more spectrally efficient technologies.76 Carriers can also encourage users to
offload more of their traffic to Wi-Fi networks.77
Carriers can and do use methods to adjust user behavior as well, including
through pricing adjustments.78 Contrary to some critics, however, price rationing of limited capacity is not the primary method of dealing with increased
demand.79 In fact, U.S. wireless carriers have accommodated a massive increase in wireless demand since the smartphone revolution without use of any
significant new spectrum since FCC Auction 73 (the 2008 700 MHz auction).80
For example, in 2010 the FCC released a report predicting that carriers would
74 See, e.g., Statement from FCC Spokesperson Tammy Sun on Letter from NTIA Addressing Harmful Interference Testing Conclusions Pertaining to Lightsquared and Global
Positioning
Systems,
FCC
(Feb.
12,
2014),
http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2012/db0215/DOC-312479A1.txt.
75 PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT:
REALIZING THE FULL POTENTIAL OF GOVERNMENT-HELD SPECTRUM TO SPUR ECONOMIC
GROWTH
vi
(July
2012),
available
at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/pcast_spectrum_report_final
_july_20_2012.pdf (noting the difficulty and cost of clearing and reallocating Federal spectrum for commercial use).
76 See FED. COMMN’CS COMM’N, supra note 34, at 12.
77 RYSAVY RESEARCH, MOBILE BROADBAND CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS AND THE NEED FOR
OPTIMIZATION
21
(2010),
available
at
http://www.rysavy.com/articles/2010_02_rysavy_mobile_broadband_capacity_constraints.p
df.
78 Zachary S. Bischof et al., Need, Want, Can Afford – Broadband Markets and the Behavior of Users, in IMC ‘14 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2014 CONFERENCE ON INTERNET MEASUREMENT CONFERENCE 73,83 (2014), available at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2663753
(“[T]he availability of faster services at a lower cost leads subscribers to sign up for services
that will be less heavily used.”). In addition, carriers may leverage their influence with device makers and application platforms to limit particular uses of mobile devices that typically consume large amounts of data, such as tethering.
79 See Ford, supra note 13.
80 FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 3, at 78 (describing the spectrum allocations to
mobile services from 1983 to 2008, and the corresponding spike in demand and innovation).
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have a 300 MHz spectrum deficit by 2014.81 U.S. carriers, however, are not
using any significant amount of spectrum allocated since the FCC’s Auction 73
in 2008 to address that deficit and significant portions of the spectrum allocated in the Auction 73, and before, remain minimally used.82 Moreover, despite
significant capital investment by U.S. carriers,83 the U.S. still has significantly
lower cell site density than many other countries and new small cell site technologies to allow further densification of wireless networks are rapidly growing.84 Spectrum exhaust is simply not on the horizon.
In addition, the viability of “new” spectrum allocation to address these issues may be limited. A typical spectrum reallocation precedes service deployment by many years due to the lengthy process of identifying and testing candidate bands, designing and conducting the auction, and relocating incumbent
users.85 Carriers must then identify potential new cell sites or upgrade candidates, develop and deploy new infrastructure, and manage any potential
sources of interference, which leads to a gradual process of deploying new infrastructure for managing demand.86 In addition, only after spectrum has been
authoritatively licensed is it rational for equipment manufacturers to invest in
developing necessary hardware and for service providers to raise money to
build-out new services.
Spectrum demand forecasts are therefore critical for regulators to efficiently
allocate spectrum and maximize overall social benefit. As a result of the long
lead-time between spectrum allocation and start of service, regulators rely on
demand projections years into the future to help guide their decisions.87 They
See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 34, at 26.
Neal Gompa, T-Mobile buys Verizon’s Lower 700 MHz Spectrum to Enable Broad
Coverage 200Mbps
LTE,
EXTREME TECH (Jan. 8, 2014, 10:30 AM),
http://www.extremetech.com/computing/174299-t-mobile-buys-verizons-lower-700mhzspectrum-to-enable-broad-coverage-200mbps-lte (explaining that Verizon was not using the
A-Block).
83 See Background on CTIA’s Wireless Industry Survey, CTIA 12 (June 2014),
http://www.ctia.org/docs/default-source/Facts-Stats/ctia_survey_ye_2013_graphicsfinal.pdf?sfvrsn=2 (stating that U.S. carriers have invested a cumulative total of nearly $400
billion since 1985).
84 See Sean Kinney, Some 75 Mobile Network Operators Have Deployed Small Cells,
RCRWIRELESSNEWS (Mar. 19, 2015), http://www.rcrwireless.com/20150319/hetnetnews/small-cell-shipments-top-10-million (noting 10.2 million small cell units being used
by 75 mobile network operators).
85 See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 3, at 79 (noting that historically it has taken
6 to 13 years to reallocate spectrum, from first step to availability for use).
86 See id. at XII-XIII (describing the spectrum allocations to mobile services from 1983
to 2008, and the corresponding spike in demand and innovation).
87 See id. at 79 (noting historical time lags of between 6 and 13 years for reallocating
spectrum); see generally Dr. Robert Roche, Mobile Usage Continues to Increase + Projection Say Skyrocketing Demand = More Spectrum Required, CTIA BLOG (Feb. 6, 2015),
81
82
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also use application-specific demand forecasts to help determine whether clearing spectrum bands is profitable and what conditions (such as participation
restrictions, interference mitigation methods, or buildout requirements) should
apply to various spectrum bands.88 These decisions in turn significantly shape
how wireless industries evolve and what kind of wireless infrastructure is deployed. Ensuring that demand data is as reliable as possible, and that measures
are taken to mitigate risk of error, is therefore essential for effective spectrum
management. This paper, however, finds evidence that, despite the importance,
regulators have come to rely on reports that have repeatedly proven to be inaccurate and have taken few measures to adjust policies or mitigate the risk of
error going forward.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II examines
several major demand forecasts and assesses their reliability through qualitative and statistical evidence. Section III explores some possible underlying
reasons for inaccuracy in these reports. Due to the small overall number of
such forecasts, larger-scale econometric analyses are infeasible, so the analysis
focuses on general trends and themes. Section IV focuses on methods to mitigate errors going forward, while Section V presents some spectrum-specific
policy suggestions and concluding thoughts.
II. MAJOR DATA FORECASTS AND THEIR HISTORICAL RELIABILITY
Many spectrum demand estimates, even those used to determine national
policy, are conducted by private entities rather than government agencies.89
Expert agencies rely on these estimates, perhaps by combining and/or averaging several forecasts at once, for policy analysis and planning, either due to
lack of sufficient in-house expertise or for cost and time reasons.90 When government agencies do directly address demand, they often commission spectrum
demand projections from outside experts.91 While this may be justified by an
http://blog.ctia.org/2015/02/06/mobile-usage-more-spectrum-required/ (demonstrating the
necessity of projections in determining spectrum usage).
88 Such factors are key in FCC rulemakings about spectrum auction policies and procedures. See, e.g., Spectrum Management, supra note 72.
89 See, e.g., CISCO, CISCO VISUAL NETWORKING INDEX: GLOBAL MOBILE DATA TRAFFIC
FORECAST
UPDATE,
2012-2017
(2013),
available
at
http://newsroom.cisco.com/documents/10157/1142732/Cisco_VNI_Mobile_Data_Traffic_F
orecast_2012_2017_white_paper.pdf.
90 Tim Farrar, Is Cisco Stacking the Deck with its Mobile Data Numbers?, GIGAOM
(Feb. 09, 2013, 10:30 AM), https://gigaom.com/2013/02/09/is-cisco-stacking-the-deck-withits-mobile-data-numbers/.
91 Examples include the FCC using projections from Cisco, the Canadian Government
using Plumb Research projections, and Ofcom’s use of Real Wireless projections. See also
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internal lack of appropriate econometric and technical expertise, it may also
reduce the quality of external and oversight scrutiny about the results. Such
scrutiny can also consume significant amounts of agency time and resources.92
By pointing to market estimates and referring to outside expertise, on the other
hand, agencies are able to suggest an industry consensus and avoid industry
and government challenges to their data.93 Of course, to the extent the estimates
in the market are inaccurate, the range of estimates used by the government
agencies will have the same shortcomings.
A. Industry Participant Forecasts
Industry forecasts are among the most common and most frequently updated
spectrum forecasts.94 For example, the Cisco Visual Networking Index (VNI),
which projects wireless and wireline demand four to six years into the future,
has estimated mobile demand for many years, is widely cited, and in recent
years has faced few competing projections.95
However, Cisco VNI projections have proven unreliable when compared to
their actual measurements and updated projections (Chart II-1).96 For example,
over the most recent seven forecasts, overestimates were nearly twice as frequent as underestimates (19 vs. 10).97 Overestimates are also on average of
greater magnitude than underestimates (103 vs. 81 PB/month).98 Cisco’s overestimation was particularly high in their 2011-2016 forecast;99 the two subsequent reports have featured demand forecasts approximately twenty-five per-

id.
92 See generally Steven J. Crowley, Three Invalid Assumptions that Make the FCC’s
Spectrum Requirements Model Skew High, STEVEN CROWLEY (Nov. 19, 2011),
http://stevencrowley.com/2011/11/19/three-invalid-assumptions-that-make-the-fcc’sspectrum-requirements-model-skew-high/.
93 See id.
94 See, e.g., FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 34, at 5-6.
95 See, e.g., Farrar, supra note 90 (illustrating the authority of Cisco’s mobile VNI forecast).
96 Author’s calculations based on Cisco Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecasts and Cisco
Visual Networking Index spanning a timeframe of 2007-2017.
97 Author’s calculations based on Cisco Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecasts and Cisco
Visual Networking Index spanning a timeframe of 2007-2017.
98 Author’s calculations based on Cisco Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecasts and Cisco
Visual Networking Index spanning a timeframe of 2007-2017.
99 See CISCO, CISCO VISUAL NETWORKING INDEX: GLOBAL MOBILE DATA TRAFFIC
FORECAST
UPDATE,
2011-2016
3
(2012),
available
at
http://www.puremobile.com/media/infortis/documents/cisco_mobile_forecast.pdf.
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cent lower.100 Moreover, the longer the timeframe, the more likely the estimates
are likely to be over-projections due to exponential growth issues.101
Perhaps Cisco’s most significant forecast inaccuracy was its 2012 projections for Western European mobile traffic. In February 2012, Cisco estimated
that December traffic (ten months later) would be 366 PB.102 But in February
2013, Cisco had lowered this projection more than fifty percent, to 181 PB.103
Some analysts consider the 180 PB figure to also be too high.104
Chart II-1: Cisco VNI Estimates Over Time105

Sources: Cisco Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecast; Cisco Visual Networking
Index; author's calculations 	
  

See CISCO, supra note 89, at 3; CISCO, CISCO VISUAL NETWORKING INDEX: FORECAST
METHODOLOGY
2013-2018
(2014),
available
at
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/service-provider/global-cloud-indexgci/Cloud_Index_White_Paper.pdf.
101 Author’s calculations based on Cisco Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecasts and Cisco
Visual Networking Index spanning a timeframe of 2007-2017.
102 CISCO, supra note 99, at 24; Cisco Slashes its Mobile Data Forecasts, But the Numbers Still Look Far too High, ANALYSYS MASON (Feb. 15, 2013)
http://www.analysysmason.com/About-Us/News/Insight/Cisco-mobile-data-forecastsFeb2013/.
103 CISCO, supra note 89, at 27; see also Cisco Slashes its Mobile Data Forecasts, supra
note 102.
104 Cisco Slashes its Mobile Data Forecasts, supra note 102.
105 Author’s calculations based on Cisco Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecasts and Cisco
Visual Networking Index spanning a timeframe of 2007-2017.
100

AND
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B. International
l. Group Forecasts
The ITU has also endorsed a set of spectrum demand projections that were
last updated in 2006.106 These projections combined a variety of industry and
research forecasts (Chart II-2) and indicate that, on average, between 1280
MHz and 1720 MHz of spectrum will be needed by 2020.107 The ITU stratified
the estimates based on potential need scenarios, but even the low end of the
estimate is well above the FCC’s estimate that the U.S. will need 500 MHz of
additional wireless spectrum by then (supplementing the already 547 MHz
available for mobile broadband as of 2010).108 However, considering its high
level of economic development and device penetration, by ITU’s own criteria,
the U.S. should garner at least an “average need” classification, which would
widen the disparity between ITU and FCC.109
Mobile industry analyst Tim Farrar notes that the ITU forecasts imply typical global demand per square kilometer in 2020 will be 100 times greater than
the demand in the 1 kilometer square area around the 2014 Super Bowl stadium during the game – arguably one the highest traffic events in the world.110
Despite their age and a lack of updates to recalibrate baseline figures, however,
these ITU estimates are still cited in policy debates, for example by CTIA.111

106 See, e.g., INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, ESTIMATED SPECTRUM BANDWIDTH REQUIREMENTS FOR THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF IMT -2000 AND IMT-ADVANCED (2006), available

at http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-r/opb/rep/R-REP-M.2078-2006-PDF-E.pdf.
107 See id. at 1.
108 See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 3, at 84.
109 See INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, FUTURE SPECTRUM REQUIREMENTS ESTIMATE ON TERRESTRIAL IMT 9 (2013), available at http://www.itu.int/ITU-R/go/patents/en.
110 Tim Farrar, A Hundred Superbowls per Sq KM?, TMF ASSOCIATES MSS BLOG (June
06, 2014), http://tmfassociates.com/blog/2014/06/17/a-hundred-superbowls-per-sq-km/
111 See Marinho, supra note 37; CTIA, ITU: More Spectrum is Essential, CTIA – THE
WIRELESS ASS’N BLOG (Oct. 23, 2012), http://blog.ctia.org/2011/02/14/itu-more-spectrumis-essential/.
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Chart II-2: Projections used by ITU112
Mobile global data traffic estimates from 2011 to 2015 based on multiple
sources

The disparity between different types of estimates included in the report is
suggestive. The two highest estimates were from equipment manufacturers
(Cisco and Alcatel-Lucent), which tend to directly benefit from spectrum reallocations to MNOs, since they sell much of the equipment used in such relocations and subsequent infrastructure redeployment.113 The two lowest projections were conducted by independent research firms (Informa and Analysy
Mason).114 As noted in Section IV, even independent research firms may have
institutional relationships and biases that potentially hinder complete objectivity. However, independent research firms have a less direct relationship to the
benefits of additional spectrum allocation, so it is reasonable to expect that
112 INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, ASSESSMENT OF THE GLOBAL MOBILE BROADBAND DEPLOYMENTS AND FORECASTS FOR INTERNATIONAL MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATIONS 16 (2011),

available at http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-r/opb/rep/R-REP-M.2243-2011-PDF-E.pdf.
113 Id. at 6.
114 Id. at 18.
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they are less likely, on average, to be subject to such biases than equipment
manufacturers or service providers.
Furthermore, a 2011 ITU report115 noted that earlier ITU projections, made
in 2005 (ITU-R M.2072), were too low based on traffic growth in the intervening time period.116 This suggests that the ITU’s aggressive projections two
years later, in 2006,117 were, at some level, a reaction to perceptions of earlier
underestimation. A chart from the 2011 report with 2005 and newer projections is shown in Chart II-3 below.

Chart II-3: ITU traffic estimates done at year 2005 (Report ITU-R
M.2072)118

115 See generally id. ITU is the leading publisher of telecommunication technology, regulatory and standard information. A report labeled ITU-R, means that the report was
published by the Radio Communication Sector of ITU. Id.
116 Id. at 15.
117 INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, supra note 106.
118 INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, supra note 112, at 15.
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Like the ITU, the FCC has only made limited efforts to develop independent
spectrum projections. The FCC relied heavily on estimates from Cisco, ITU,
Ofcom, and other outside groups for the 2010 National Broadband Report’s
spectrum allocation recommendations. 119 These recommendations called for
allocation of an additional 300 MHz for mobile broadband spectrum between
2010 and 2015, and 500 MHz by 2020.120 The FCC further justified this projection through a technical paper that estimated a 275 MHz deficit by 2014.121
Despite being the only technical analysis of spectrum requirements conducted
by the FCC in recent years, this paper did not make independent demand estimates but relied on an average of three sets of spectrum demand projections
(Cisco, Coda, and Yankee Group, with Cisco’s being the highest), with limited
further analysis (Chart II-4).122
Chart II-4: Demand Forecasts Used by FCC123

119
120
121
122
123

See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 3, at 76-77, 84.
See id. at 75, 84.
See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 34, at 26.
Id. at 9, Exhibit 4.
Id.
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Chart II-5: FCC Traffic Projections vs. Actual

The National Broadband Plan’s recommendations, as further developed in
various executive-branch policies, remain the framework for current U.S. spectrum policy, and the FCC has made significant progress in meeting its interim
goal of 300 MHz of additional mobile broadband spectrum.124 However, as
Chart II-5 shows, the Plan’s forecast results did not come to fruition.125 The
U.S. mobile broadband traffic figures used in the plan’s development have not
actually increased at the rate projected by the FCC.126
The actual traffic acceleration from 2012 to 2013 is likely the result of wireless carriers with excess capacity re-introducing unlimited data plans during
the year.127 As discussed in Section I.D, significant allocated spectrum remains
unused in the U.S. The ability to reintroduce mass unlimited plans while leaving significant amounts of spectrum unused indicates that spectrum exhaust is
not currently a significant factor in the business decisions of certain MVNOs.
Moreover, it is not clear that demand based on usage in a near-zero marginal

124 U.S. DEP’T. OF COMMERCE, FOURTH INTERIM PROGRESS REPORT ON THE TEN-YEAR
PLAN AND TIMETABLE AND PLAN FOR QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENTS OF SPECTRUM USAGE 1718 (2014).
125 Author’s analysis. See also FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 34, at 18-19, Exhibits 10-11; Ford, supra note 13, at 5 tbl. 1.
126 The Difference is calculated by subtracting the (Predicted Cum. Growth Index (2010
FCC Est)) from the (Actual Cum. Growth Index & YE 2014 Est.). See Ford, supra note 13,
at 5.
127 See, e.g., Mike Dano, H2O offers unlimited service on AT&T network for $60/month,
FIERCEWIRELESS.com, (Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.fiercewireless.com/story/h2o-offersunlimited-service-att-network-60month/2011-09-02; see also Marguerite Reardon, Wireless
spectrum shortage? What spectrum shortage?, CNET (Sept. 27, 2011, 5:40 PM),
http://www.cnet.com/news/wireless-spectrum-shortage-what-spectrum-shortage/.
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cost environment is the appropriate measurement to use for public policy decisions to allocate a finite resource.
2. Ofcom Projections and UK Policy
In June 2013, the British telecom regulator Ofcom released a spectrum demand forecast conducted by Real Wireless.128 As some analysts noted, this report predicted an effective demand of 10 petabytes per square kilometer by
2020.129 After some criticism of this figure, the report was revised downward
by a factor of 1,000, to 10 terabytes per square kilometer in the final version,
released March 11, 2014.130 Ofcom did not explain the change and stated that:
“since the report has served its purpose we do not plan to carry out any further
work to update it.”131 The magnitude of swings in projection undermines its
methodological credibility, as well as related policy decisions.132
III. FOUR POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR UNRELIABLE
FORECASTING
Spectrum demand forecasts present unusual challenges. Unlike most goods,
few consumers want spectrum itself; they want to make phone calls, send text
messages, access the internet, send email, and stream video and music. 133
Moreover, the amount of spectrum needed for a consumer voice and data applications can change dramatically depending on the technology employed by
the operator, external factors such as the development of applications and application markets, and an operator’s pricing and billing model.134 This section
explores several analytical, structural, and economic factors that help explain
why spectrum forecast tend towards unreliability. In isolation, each factor
highlights the inherent uncertainty of predicting mobile demand and the

REAL WIRELESS, supra note 42.
See Tim Farrar, Note to the telecom industry: Beware of false models, GIGAOM.COM
(Feb. 22, 2014, 1:30 PM), https://gigaom.com/2014/02/22/note-to-the-telecom-industrybeware-of-false-models/; see also Farrar, supra note 110.
130 REAL WIRELESS, supra note 42, at 55, fig. 44; see also Farrar, supra note 110.
131 Future Demand for Mobile Broadband Spectrum and Consideration of Potential
Candidate Bands, OFCOM, http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/consultations/cfi-mobile-bb
(last updated Mar. 18, 2013).
132 See Farrar, supra note 110.
133 See Aaron Smith, U.S. Smartphone Use in 2015, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Apr. 1,
2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/01/us-smartphone-use-in-2015/.
134 See CISCO, supra note 89, at 2-3, 25-26 (noting a need for large estimate updates due
to unforeseen changes in business models, device usage, and traffic management systems).
128
129
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amount of spectrum required to satisfy this demand. Together, however, these
elements compound to produce far higher overall levels of uncertainty.
A. Technical reasons for bias
There are several technical reasons for bias in spectrum forecasts including:
1. Limited Use of Risk Management and Transparency
Spectrum forecasters make little use of (or at least, often do not release) risk
management techniques in their analysis. Sensitivity analysis, scenario analysis, and error ranges are all standard risk analysis tools for complex models
where data sources and relationships are uncertain.135 Cisco’s methodology,
which “begins with the number and growth of connections and devices, applies
adoption rates for applications, and then multiplies the application’s user base
by Cisco’s estimated minutes of use and KB per minute for that application,” 136
exemplifies such a complex model. Although such added complexity can ultimately improve a prediction by incorporating and correcting for various subtle influences, the cost is often uncertainty and variance.137
Reporting a single number, for example, is misleading because it implies a
stronger certainty than an econometric or analytic model is capable of, especially in the case of multi-step models.138 Moreover, only loosely associating a
result with its methodological underpinnings allows other organizations to
more easily ignore qualifications and other nuance, facilitating the processes
that disconnect the origins of a projection with its subsequent rhetorical and
policy uses.139 This also helps contribute to the longevity of cited projections;
U.S. spectrum policy, for example, still works on the assumption that 500 MHz
of new spectrum is needed even though that estimate was made four years ago
and the wireless market has changed substantially since then.140
135 See DAVID VOSE, SCENARIO ANALYSIS: A QUANTITATIVE GUIDE, 4, 47 (2008); Scenario
Analysis:
A
Tool
for
Task
Managers,
WORLDBANK,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPSIA/Resources/4900231121114603600/13053_scenarioanalysis.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2015).
136 CISCO, supra note 13, at 37.
137 See, e.g., Louis Anthony Cox, Jr, Internal Dose, Uncertainty Analysis and Complexity of Risk Models, 25 ENV’T. INT’L 841, 841-42, 847 (1999); Jacques LeLorier et al., Discrepancies between Meta-Analyses and Subsequent Large Randomized, Controlled Trials,
337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 536. 536 (1997).
138 See generally GEORGE C. JUDGE, INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
ECONOMETRICS, 1, 5 (1998).
139 Sanchez, supra note 16.
140 See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 3, at 75, 84.
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Moreover, the Cisco forecast uses “Ovum, Machina, Strategy Analytics, Infonetics, Gartner, IDC, Dell’Oro, Synergy, ACG Research, Nielsen, comScore,
Verto Analytics, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), CTIA,
and telecommunications regulators in each of the countries covered by VNI.”141
Although using all available data sources is generally an analytical best practice, combining data from many sources may also increase errors and uncertainties from data compatibility issues and different methodologies, and reduces the number of comparable independent assessments that can serve to ground
or calibrate an assessment.142 Combining data sources also presents risk of a
form of publication bias, because these sources and analyses are often only
reported upon successful conclusion of a particular industry-analyst contract;
unfavorable analyses are more likely to be terminated before publication or
result in incomplete or low-quality data that must be omitted to preserve overall analytical quality.143
The lack of detailed methodological and risk information is also part of a
more general trend for industry analysts to closely guard their methodologies
and data.144 As the U.S. Government Accountability Office notes, “according to
experts and government officials, industry associations do not always disclose
their proprietary data sources and methods, making it difficult to verify their
estimates.”145 Although there may be good business reasons for doing so in the
case of industry reports and analyses,146 it is more difficult to make the case
that regulators making decisions about public resources should rely on such
estimates when assumptions and methodology are opaque.
2. Exponential Estimation
Spectrum demand forecasts typically employ exponential estimation methods for extrapolating demand growth, “based on existing mobile broadband
growth and new trends” in Internet and telephone services.147 However, this
means small errors or uncertainties can become extremely large at the edges of
the forecast’s time horizon. For example, the standard deviation of the external
CISCO, supra note 13, at 36.
Robert E. Slavin, Best-Evidence Synthesis: An Alternative to Meta-Analytic and Traditional Reviews, 15 EDUC. RESEARCHER 5, 5 (1986).
143 See Robert Rosenthal, The “File Drawer Problem” and Tolerance for Null Results,
86 PSYCHOL. BULL. 638, 638 (1979).
144 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-762T, INSIGHTS GAINED FROM
EFFORTS TO QUANTIFY THE EFFECTS OF COUNTERFEIT AND PIRATED GOODS IN THE U.S.
ECONOMY 5, 8 (2013).
145 Id. at 8.
146 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 19, at 8.
147 INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, supra note 112.
141
142
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data sources that the ITU used to estimate average global mobile data traffic
from 2011 to 2015 steadily and rapidly increased (Table III-1).148 When the
past five Cisco estimates are projected to 2018 using comparable Internet
growth rates, they also show high variances in the final predictions (Chart III1).149

148 The authors used their own calculations to create the numbers in Table III-1. For the
initial numbers usein their calculations. See id. (stating that by 2020, mobile traffic will have
increased 33 times from 2010 figures).
149 The authors used their own calculations to create the numbers in Chart III-1. For the
initial numbers used in their calculations, please see CISCO, CISCO VISUAL NETWORKING
INDEX: GLOBAL MOBILE DATA TRAFFIC FORECAST UPDATE, 2009-2014 12 (2010), available
at http://www.slideshare.net/danilogj/global-mobile-data-traffic-forecast-update-2009-2014;
CISCO, CISCO VISUAL NETWORKING INDEX: GLOBAL MOBILE DATA TRAFFIC FORECAST UPDATE,
2010-2015 19 (2011), available at http://tmfassociates.com/blog/wpcontent/uploads/2013/02/Cisco-mobile-VNI-Feb-2011.pdf; CISCO, supra note 99, at 24;
CISCO, supra note 89, at 27; CISCO, supra note 100 . Data were extrapolated using lagged
growth rates for wireline Internet traffic.
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Chart III-1: Cisco North American Mobile Traffic Estimates and
Projections
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3. Pricing and Business Developments
Mobile demand, even if it could be directly measured, will usually exceed
actual supply (i.e., mobile network traffic) due to carrier pricing and policy
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adjustments.150 Most goods and services, for example, have elastic demand
curves - as price increases, demand decreases and vice versa.151 Mobile broadband is no exception, with carriers continually making a number of pricing
adjustments during the boom in smart phone and mobile data usage.152
However few goods or services have pricing policies that change as rapidly
as seen in the mobile broadband market, which faces demands for higher
speeds and data usage at uncertain rates of change.153 Moreover, it is not appropriate to interpret most carrier pricing adjustments as solely dedicated to reducing data usage. Between 2007 and 2010, most wireless operators, like AT&T,
offered unlimited voice and data for relatively low monthly fees,154 but have
since ceased those plans,155 now finding themselves in trouble for data throttling those who are still on the original plans.156 As smart phone penetration
increased during the 2010 - 2011 time frame, wireless companies began migrating users to plans with data caps, although some customers remained
grandfathered into the original plan.157 Incremental use beyond that of a fixed
150 See Ford, supra note 13, at 2, 4 (noting that demand is not directly observable and
that actual traffic represents a mix of demand- and supply-side factors, including price increases, offloading, and rationing).
151 Gerhard Adam, Economic Theory – Supply and Demand, SCIENCE2.0 (July 10, 2009),
http://www.science20.com/gerhard_adam/blog/economic_theory_–_supply_and_demand.
152 Most notably, this occurred when major carriers began transitioning from unlimited
to tiered data plans. See, e.g., Peter Suciu, Mobile users to carriers: ‘Give me my unlimited
data,’ FORTUNE (Sept. 13, 2012), http://fortune.com/2012/09/13/mobile-users-to-carriersgive-me-my-unlimited-data.
153 INT’L TELECOMM. UNION & THE BROADBAND COMM’N, THE STATE OF BROADBAND
2014:
BROADBAND
FOR
ALL
23
(2014),
available
at
http://www.broadbandcommission.org/documents/reports/bb-annualreport2014.pdf.
154 Timothy Stenovec, AT&T Sued for Reducing Speed of ‘Unlimited’ Data Plans, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/28/att-slowingspeeds-data-throttling-ftc_n_6062360.html; Sinead Carew, Verizon to eliminate unlimited
data plans, REUTERS (July 5, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/05/usverizonwireless-tiered-data-idUSTRE7645SF20110705; Lisa Eadicicco, Which Carrier is
the Best? Here’s How Data Prices Compare for Verizon, AT&T, Sprint, and T-Mobile, BUS.
INSIDER (Sept. 20, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/verizon-vs-att-sprint-tmobilecarrier-data-plan-pricing-2014-9 (until 2010 each of the four major U.S. carriers offered
unlimited data plans to new customers; Verizon and AT&T have discontinued new unlimited data plans).
155 JR Raphael, Smartphone Data Shake-Up: The End of ‘Unlimited,’ COMPUTERWORLD
(Feb.
8,
2012,
6:00
AM),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/249532/smartphone_data_shake_up_the_end_of_unlimited.
html.
156 Lisa Schifferie, FTC sues AT&T for limiting “unlimited data,” FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/ftc-sues-att-limiting-unlimited-data.
157 Stenovec, supra note 154; Sinead Carew, AT&T to end unlimited use mobile data
plan, REUTERS (June 2, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/02/us-attidUSTRE6513H120100602 (stating that AT&T eliminated unlimited data plans for new
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plan was no longer free for most users.158 Partially as a result, usage, particularly among heavy users declined significantly.159 Evidence shows much of the
decline was due to a reduction in usage in the top 1% of users, whose usage
declined from 52% in 2010 to 18% in 2014.160
It is unclear, however, whether the carriers’ primary motivation for ending
unlimited data plans for new subscribers was spectral capacity. While the end
of the unlimited data plans may have been implemented partly to control usage
to ensure quality of service, it may also reflect a desire of the wireless carriers
to increase revenue and leverage increase market power following several
years of mergers that increased industry concentration.161 Allowing existing
customers to keep their unlimited plans (even if subject to potential throttling)
also creates high switching costs for users who would lose those plans if they
switched providers. This potentially lowers expensive subscriber churn for the
carriers. At the same time, carriers have persisted in some policies that increase
data usage, including the reintroduction of unlimited data plans.162
Analysts forecasting spectrum demand rarely have access to detailed information about carriers’ business plans or technology rollout, and therefore must
make assumptions that results in inaccurate data forecasts.163 This puts them at
a significant disadvantage when predicting demand induced by changes in
technology implementation and/or pricing. However, none of these business
plans were unforeseeable, and demand projections that employed proper risk
customers on June 7, 2010); Carew, supra note 154 (stating that Verizon eliminated unlimited data plans to new customers on July 7, 2011); Tero Kuittinen, AT&T and Verizon are
about to put the squeeze on subscribers,
BGR
(June
21,
2013),
http://bgr.com/2013/06/21/att-verizon-fees-analysis (noting that AT&T and Verizon account
for approximately 65% of U.S. subscribers); Eadicicco, supra note 154 (noting that TMobile and Sprint have retained their unlimited data plans).
158 Stenovec, supra note 154; Carew, supra note 154; Eadicicco, supra note 154 (stating
that data plans no longer allowed for unlimited usage, but now provided fixed data plans,
with the exception of T-Mobile and Sprint that still issue unlimited data plans).
159 J. Armand Musey, Wireless Demand Projections- Elasticity of the Top-1% of Users,
GA GOLDIN ASSOCIATES (Jan. 26, 2014), http://www.goldinassociates.com/blogs/telecommedia-tech/wireless-demand-projections-elasticity-of-the-top-1-percent-users/; see CISCO,
supra note 89, at 17 (stating that unlimited data plans dropped from 81% to 45%, while
tiered data plans grew during a three year study from 2011-2013).
160 CISCO, supra note 14, at 2.
161 Jon Brodkin, Analysis: Wireless data caps more about profit than congestion, ARS
TECHNICA (Oct. 8, 2014), http://arstechnica.com/staff/2014/10/analysis-wireless-data-capsmore-about-profit-than-congestion; Steven Musil, AT&T completes $1.2B acquisition of
Leap Wireless, CNET (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.cnet.com/news/at-t-completes-1-2bacquisition-of-leap-wireless/.
162 Victor Luckerson, Unlimited Data Plans: Are They Coming Back From the Dead?,
TIME (Aug. 23, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/08/23/unlimited-data-plans-are-theycoming-back-from-the-dead.
163 Crowley, supra note 92.
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analysis tools could have included the possibility of such business plan changes in their models, rather than consistently citing data projections from external
sources or reporting only a single scenario.164 Cisco, for example, cited the
move to tiered business plans as one reason for its large downward revision of
its 2011-2016 mobile demand forecasts.165 In recent months, the U.S. wireless
industry has begun to lower prices and embrace unlimited data plans once
again, as well as more aggressively marketing data-share plans.166 This is clearly not a move it would do if facing a situation of spectrum exhaust. As a result,
we expect an increase in usage as zero-cost marginal pricing will encourage
usage with minimal value.
More fundamentally, the definition of mobile “demand” is uncertain and can
change depending on context. If the definition of demand is demand with no
marginal cost, it is likely to be quite high.167 From a policy perspective, it is
questionable whether demand at no marginal cost is an appropriate measure of
social need.168 Supplying spectrum to mobile broadband based on demand at
zero marginal cost encourages people to use spectrum for purposes with minimal value and risks, depriving allocation for other uses with much higher marginal value.169 However, demand measured at a certain price per MB is also
problematic. Future applications may require multiples of throughputs, just as
today’s applications require multiples of bandwidth of applications in use 5 to
10 years ago.170 If projections assume the price per MB remains constant, averId.
CISCO, supra note 89, at 4.
166 Luckerson, supra note 162.
167 William Spaulding, Pure Monopoly: Demand, Revenue and Costs, Price Determination,
Profit
Maximization
and
Loss
Minimization,
THISMATTER.COM,
http://thismatter.com/economics/pure-monopoly-demand-revenue-costs-profits.htm
(last
visited Mar. 7, 2015) (referring to the Price Determination model, which shows high demand when marginal cost is at zero).
168 A similar argument can also be made for wireless demand for fixed applications
(wireline substitution). Is it appropriate for such demand to be considered, for public policy
purposes, as a measure of social need given that a wireline alternative is available? We do
no attempt to resolve this issue in this paper, but flag it for future discussion.
169 At zero marginal cost, individuals would use bandwidth until marginal benefits are
zero, for example, by using mobile broadband even when comparable Wi-Fi networks with
less capacity restrictions are available. See Austin Frakt, Simply put: Marginal cost/benefit,
THE
INCIDENTAL
ECONOMIST
(Feb.
18,
2011),
http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/simply-put-marginal-costbenefit (relating a
similar dynamic in health care, where if the cost of medical care was $0, individuals would
use medical services indiscriminately without regards to overall or societal cost until the
marginal benefit also equals $0).
170 In the Matter of Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to all Americans in Reasonable and Timely Fashion and Possible steps to
Accelerate Such a Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996 as Amended by the Broadband Data Improvement Act, 2015 Broadband Progress Re164
165

330

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

[Vol. 23

age consumer bills would increase to many multiples of current bills. This
would clearly be unaffordable for most consumers, and does not take into account properly both increasing spectral efficiency and increasing cell site densification, which both reduce overall spectrum need171 and have led to steadily
decreasing per-unit costs in the mobile industry.172 Clearly, demand modeling
needs to assume some marginal cost, but one that declines over time to match
the increasing availability of technology to deliver throughput at reasonable
prices.
4. Offloading and Other Technological Developments
a. Rapid growth in Wi-Fi offloading
Offloading to small cells or Wi-Fi networks is another significant driver of
wireless demand changes. Globally, traffic offloaded onto fixed networks increased from 31% (14.3 PB/month)173 in 2010 to 46% (1.2 EB/month) in
2014.174 This traffic bypasses the carriers’ networks, reducing the carriers’ need
for dedicated spectrum to accommodate mobile traffic.175 Given the increasing
ease of Wi-Fi deployment 176 and growing consumer expectation of Wi-Fi
availability,177 it is likely the trend towards increasing Wi-Fi offloading will
increase. Additionally, the FCC has proposed adding up to 195 MHz in the 5
GHz band of spectrum for unlicensed access that supports Wi-Fi and similar
transmission technologies, and 100 MHz in the 3.5 GHz band for small-cell
port,
30
FCC
Rcd
1375
para.
29-32,
available
at
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-15-10A1.pdf.
171 See FED. COMMN’CS COMM’N, supra note 34, at 6.
172 Roger Entner, Entner: What is the price of a megabyte of wireless data?, FierceWireless, http://www.fiercewireless.com/story/entner-what-price-megabyte-wireless-data/201104-13.
173 CISCO 2010-2015, supra note 149, at 2.
174 CISCO, supra note 14, at 22.
175 Kyunghan Lee et al., Mobile data offloading: how much can WiFi deliver?, 21
IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORKING 536, 536 (2012), available at
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6353239.
176 iPass Wi-Fi Growth Map Shows 1 Public Hotspot for Every 20 people on Earth by
2018,
IPASS,
http://www.ipass.com/press-releases/ipass-wi-fi-growth-map-shows-onepublic-hotspot-for-every-20-people-on-earth-by-2018/ (last visited May 8, 2015) (estimating
that Wi-Fi hotspots will increase from 47.7 million hotspots globally at year-end 2014 to
more than 340 million by 2018).
177 Total Wi-Fi® device shipments to surpass ten billion this month, WI-FI ALLIANCE
(Jan. 5, 2015), http://www.wi-fi.org/news-events/newsroom/total-wi-fi-device-shipments-tosurpass-ten-billion-this-month (noting that roughly 4.5 billion Wi-Fi products are in use as
of January 2015). Many contemporary devices, such as certain tablets, laptops, and smart
entertainment devices, can access broadband service only through Wi-Fi.
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use on a shared basis.178 More than 1000 MHz of additional spectrum currently
used or shared by the U.S. federal government is under consideration for repurposing, much of it on a shared basis.179 This additional spectrum is likely to
facilitate additional offloading from wireless carriers’ networks, particularly in
urban environments where demand is highest and small cell sites most effective.180
Offloading was another major factor in Cisco’s large downward revisions of
its 2011-2016 demand estimates, although the company also cited a slowdown
in new mobile laptop connections.181 However, Cisco has been tracking offloading trends since at least 2010,182 and such a large trend towards offloading
again could have been predicted using reasonable risk management techniques
and multi-scenario forecasting.
It is important to note that offloading does not represent a true supply-side
adjustment in the larger context of spectrum policy.183 Offloading is still wireless data transmission that uses spectral resources, albeit in an alternate, more
socially optimal, configuration, especially in certain densely populated areas.184
Moreover, offloading allows for the stratification of different types of mobile
data; for many consumer applications with low quality-of-service requirements, Wi-Fi offers comparable service with no noticeable degradation, allowing exclusive-use mobile spectrum to better serve highly sensitive needs.185
Thus, offloading represents the most tangible and important example of the
direct tradeoff that regulators must make when allocating spectral resources
and highlights alternative arrangements to exclusive-use licenses that can satisfy increases in mobile demand.
178 In the Matter of Revision of Part 15 of the Commission’s Rules to Permit Unlicensed
National Information Infrastructure (U-NII) Devices in the 5 GHz Band, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, ET Docket No. 13-49, 28 FCC Rcd 1769 para. 2 (Feb. 20, 2013).
179 U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, supra note 124, at 6, 19.
180 WIRELESS 20/20, CARRIER WIFI OFFLOAD: BUILDING A BUSINESS CASE FOR CARRIER
W IF I
OFFLOAD
2-3
(2012),
available
at
http://www.wireless2020.com/docs/CarrierWiFiOffloadWhitePaper03202012.pdf
(noting
that return of investment for offloading scales with population density).
181 CISCO, supra note 89, at 2-3.
182 CISCO 2010-2015, supra note 149, at 2.
183 See Ford, supra note 13, at 3.
184 See, e.g., MONICA PAOLINI, SENZA FILI CONSULTING, THE ECONOMICS OF SMALL CELLS
AND
WI-FI
OFFLOAD
2
(2012),
available
at
http://www.senzafiliconsulting.com/Portals/0/docs/Reports/SenzaFili_SmallCellWiFiTCO.p
df (noting that small cells and Wi-Fi can allow mobile operators to reduce total cost of ownership by 50%).
185 See SHUO DENG ET AL., WIFI, LTE, OR BOTH?: MEASURING MULTI-HOMED WIRELESS
INTERNET PERFORMANCE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2014 CONFERENCE ON INTERNET MEASUREMENT 181 (2014) (noting that WiFi outperforms LTE 40% of the time for mobile data transfers of various sizes).
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b. Compression/Network Management Technology Improvements
Wireless compression technology has improved dramatically since the inception of the industry.186 For example, LTE is approximately forty times as
spectrally efficient as early second-generation (2G) wireless technology.187 The
impact of this compression has allowed carriers to increase the amount of traffic (in conjunction with densification) that they can accommodate on a given
amount of spectrum.188 Moreover, small cell deployments have significantly
helped manage traffic in dense traffic areas.189
c. Combined Impact of Offloading and other Technologies is Significant
The combined impact of increased spectral efficiency, Wi-Fi offloading,
network management, and densification are significant. A detailed technical
analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper.190 However, consider
an illustrative example of their combined implications on spectrum demand.
Verizon’s LTE network, which carries approximately 20% of U.S. wireless
network traffic,191 ran on only 22 MHz of spectrum (in the Upper 700 MHz CBlock using two 10 MHz channels) until the end of 2013,192 while being generally considered one of the strongest U.S. networks, including in major metro
areas.193 This would imply a total need of only 100 MHz to handle the counFED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 3, at 41.
See id. at Exhibit 4-F.
188 See id. at 135 (explaining that, despite growth in industry speed requirements, compression and customer usage patterns may possibly slow growth in bandwidth needs).
189 See Kinney, supra note 84 (noting 10.2 million small cell units being used by 75 mobile network operators; of these, only 17,000 deployments were in rural or otherwise remote
areas).
190 For a more detailed analysis of spectrum and network efficiency improvements, see
LS TELECOM AG & TMF ASSOC., MOBILE SPECTRUM REQUIREMENT ESTIMATES: GETTING
THE
INPUTS
RIGHTS
33
(LS
Telecom
2014),
available
at
http://www.lstelcom.com/fileadmin/content/marketing/Press_releases/IMT_Spectrum_Requ
irements_Final_Report_v107.pdf.
191 Id.
192 Farrar, supra note 129.
193 See RootMetrics Issues First-ever National RootScore® Report on Consumer Experience
of
Mobile
Carrier
Performance,
PRWEB
(Mar.
5,
2014),
http://www.prweb.com/releases/2014/03/prweb11640701.htm (ranking Verizon with best
overall performance in how each major MNO “network performed across data, call, and text
testing, as well as which network was the most reliable and which was fastest overall”);
Press Release, J.D. Power McGraw Hill Fin., Wireless Network Data Quality Performance
Has Improved Considerably as 4G Service Coverage Becomes More Universal (Mar. 6,
2014), available at http://www.jdpower.com/press-releases/2014-us-wireless-networkquality-performance-study%E2%80%94volume-1 (noting that Verizon ranked highest in
wireless network quality performance in all regions of the U.S.).
186
187
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try’s traffic, well below the FCC’s 2010 projection that more than 524 MHz of
spectrum would be needed to handle the same traffic.194 Other carriers also
have large blocks of unused spectrum or spectrum that is reserved for older,
less efficient technologies.195 Current LTE technology operates at a theoretical
maximum downlink capacity of approximately 1.7 to 2.7 bits/Hz/cell, depending on antenna configuration.196 The next generation, LTE-Advanced, is expected to operate at between 2.4 and 3.7 bits/Hz/cell, which would represent a
capacity increase of roughly 40% for similar devices, in addition to providing
significant increases in uplink capacity.197 It is not clear that carriers will truly
face spectrum exhaust once they properly refarm existing allocations to utilize
the latest, most efficient transmission technologies. Moreover, while conservative policies regarding spectrum allocation for mobile broadband may create
capacity shortages of services in periods of rapid demand growth,198 the greatest shortages are likely to be in highly populated cities where terrestrial alternatives are most widely available.199
B.

Economic and Psychological Explanations

If pure methodological issues, technological changes, or business developments were the primary explanations for forecasting bias, one might expect
that estimates would improve over time. The long history of inaccuracy and
revision in demand estimates, including major recent revisions, suggest other
underlying explanations.200 Moreover, if estimates were neutral, the number of
projections that overestimate demand should be roughly equal to those that
underestimate demand. This suggests a systematic tendency for overestimation. At least two major categories of psychological factors can help explain
why demand estimates tend to show directional skew: optimism bias and stra-

LS TELECOM AG & TMF ASSOC., supra note 190.
See id. (stating that not all of the 547 MHz of spectrum allocated in 2010 has even
been deployed).
196 See Ian F. Akyildiz et al., The evolution to 4G cellular systems: LTE-Advanced, 3
PHYSICAL COMM. 217, 219, tbl. 1 (2010).
197 See id. at tbl. 1.
198 Hazlett & Leo, supra note 61, at 1099.
199 See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, NAT’L BROADBAND MAP, BROADBAND STATISTICS
REPORT: BROADBAND AVAILABILITY IN URBAN VS. RURAL AREAS 6, 8 (2015), available at
http://www.broadbandmap.gov/download/Broadband%20Availability%20in%20Rural%20v
s%20Urban%20Areas.pdf (noting differences in broadband availability between rural and
urban areas).
200 See Bent Flyvbjerg, From Noble Prize to Project Management: Getting Risks Right,
37 PROJECT MGMT. J. 5, 5 (2006) (detailing a new APA endorsed method of forecasting
resulting from a study of inaccuracy in demand forecasts).
194
195
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tegic misrepresentation.201 Optimism bias is “a cognitive predisposition found
with most people to judge future events in a more positive light than is warranted by actual experience,” and represents a kind of forecasting blind spot.202
Strategic misrepresentation is much more likely in cases where “where political and organizational pressures are high,” and forecasters stand to gain direct
benefit from overestimates. 203 It is difficult to think of a more politically
charged forecasting issue than spectrum, given the strong statutory oversight of
licenses and the large amount of revenue that spectrum auctions can generate.
1. Structural Issues May Exacerbate Psychological Biases
Spectrum policy faces structural issues that exacerbate psychological biases,
oftentimes through subtle organizational dynamics and regulatory processes
that unconsciously influence behavior. First, the analysts who create spectrum
demand estimates are often wireless industry veterans, dependent on the industry for their livelihoods.204 These estimates are often funded by companies with
an interest in seeing greater amounts of spectrum allocated to wireless carriers,
and who have preferences for a single large number absent of qualifiers or nuance.205 Moreover, government officials often become dependent on corporateprovided data.206 Even government-produced estimates are often outsourced to
industry consultants with a client base that benefits from having more spectrum
allocated to wireless broadband.207 Professionals who have worked in the industry also often staff government telecommunications regulatory agencies.208
Id. at 6.
Id.
203 Id. at 7.
204 See Allan Holmes, Wireless Companies Fight for Their Futures, THE CTR. FOR PUB.
INTEGRITY (Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2014/03/21/14433/wirelesscompanies-fight-their-futures (illustrating the influence that companies like Verizon and
AT&T exercise over spectrum demand estimates).
205 See id. (illustrating the influence that companies like Verizon and AT&T exercise
over spectrum demand estimates).
206 See, e.g., Statement of Michael J. Copps, Commissioner, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n,
Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, & Transportation (Jan. 14, 2003),
available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-230241A4.doc.
207 See, e.g., In the Matter of Policies Regarding Mobile Spectrum Holdings, Expanding
the Economic and Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions, Report and Order, WT Docket No. 12-269, WT Docket No. 12-268 at para. 23, n.70 (June 2,
2014). Using statistics from a study sponsored by Cisco Systems, Inc. in a Report and Order, the FCC evaluates whether current allocation of spectrum promotes and preserves competition. Id.
208 See Mark Green & Ralph Nader, Economic Regulation vs. Competition: Uncle Sam
the Monopoly Man, 82 YALE L.J. 871, 876 (1973) (noting “a kind of regular personnel inter201
202
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These professionals may be subject to some of these same biases as those who
currently work in the industry.
Second, the most powerful industry players are MNOs, who benefit when
there is more available spectrum because it allows them to spend less on infrastructure.209 In contrast, groups favoring amateur or unlicensed allocation of
spectrum are generally smaller and less established.210 As such, they face significant organizational challenges in advocating for particular spectrum policies, many are not aware of the importance of spectrum to their interests, and
they often have few resources to spend on advocacy.211 MNOs, on the other
hand, spend heavily to influence government telecommunications regulatory
bodies on spectrum issues, both through formal lobbying and through informal
methods such as commissioning academic studies, funding think tanks, and
conducting general public relations campaigns.212 Even when spectrum is realchange between agency and industry blurs what should be a sharp line between the regulator
and the regulated, and can compromise independent regulatory judgment. In short, the regulated industries are often in clear control of the regulatory process”); see generally Jeffrey E.
Cohen, The Dynamics of the “Revolving Door” on the FCC, 30 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 689
(1986); see William Gormley, A Test of the Revolving Door Hypothesis on the FCC, 23 AM.
J. OF POL. SCI. 665 (1979); see generally J.H. Snider, The Art of Spectrum Lobbying: America’s $480 Billion Spectrum Giveaway, How it Happened, and How to Prevent It From Recurring, (New Am. Found., Working paper No. 19, 2007), available at
http://www.newamerica.net/files/WorkingPaper19_SpectrumGiveaway_Snider.pdf; see also
Timothy M. LaPira & Herschel F. Thomas III, Revolving Door Lobbyists and Interest Representation, 3 INT. GRP. & ADVOCACY 4, 6 (Jan. 21, 2014), available at
http://www.palgrave-journals.com/iga/journal/v3/n1/pdf/iga201316a.pdf (noting that Commissioners of the FCC have previously worked in the broadcast industry).
209 See Yochai Benkler, Unlicensed Wireless vs. Licensed Spectrum: Evidence from
Market Adoption, 26 HARVARD J. L. & TECH. 69, 141 (2012) (noting that “[l]icensed services use the exclusivity they acquire in auctions as a substitute for capital investment in
physical infrastructure”).
210 For example, the Wireless Internet Service Providers Association is the leading trade
group for small wireless Internet service providers (“WISPs”) that often use unlicensed
spectrum. It has a membership of 800 WISPs, and estimates all WISPs service approximately 3 million people. Even if every WISP was a member, the average WISP would serve
3,750 members. The actual average size is likely considerably smaller since not every WISP
is a member. These WISPs would have collective organizing problems in advancing preferred policy positions, and collectively would have far fewer revenues than major MNOs.
211 Benkler, supra note 209, at 161.
212 See Holmes, supra note 204
The four biggest carriers together spent $37.3 million in 2013 trying to influence
lawmakers and the FCC on a host of policy issues ranging from taxes to cyber security as well as spectrum . . . . But the carriers led by AT&T and Verizon likely have
spent at least twice as much more on behind-the-scenes influence campaigns — hiring Ivy-league academics, giving cash to think tanks, associations and universities,
and employing public relations firms — all part of a synchronized effort to sway the
FCC to establish rules that favor them.
Id.
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located to new entrant wireless carriers, incumbent users are less likely to argue about whether the wireless carrier actually needs the spectrum.213 Rather,
they are likely to argue their rights under their existing licenses.214 As a result,
regulatory bodies typically do not receive balanced input from all affected parties.215 In addition, equipment providers have incentives to assist the efforts of
MNOs, since equipment companies typically develop new hardware to take
advantage of reallocated spectrum.216
Finally, most large companies want to look successful to their investors and
to banks supplying them with capital. A need for more spectrum implies a rapidly growing and successful industry. For these reasons, it is often in the best
interest of wireless veterans to be overly generous in their estimation techniques and methodologies.
2. Potential Countervailing Influences to Consider
In addition to economic and psychological factors that can cause estimates
to be inaccurate, there are also factors that can improve the accuracy of estimates that would otherwise be inaccurate. Demand estimates can become selffulfilling if the industry organizes to prepare to them. If the wireless industry
invests in capacity to handle a certain level of demand, then it faces little marginal cost for supplying that level of bandwidth, and it may then lower prices
to minimize excess capacity from going to waste. We are likely seeing this
trend today. Demand is lower than prior projections and unlimited data plans
and aggressive data plan discounting are making a comeback with major carriers.217 In this way, the process of measuring demand may, to an extent, shape
that demand.

See Benkler, supra note 209, at 157.
Benkler explains that when auctions are uncapped, large carriers are able to buy so
much spectrum as to have a market foreclosure effect on other carriers. When bidding, large
incumbents are not just paying for the right to use that spectrum, but are willing to pay a
higher value if the aggregate effect of buying such a large proportion shuts out other competitors. Thus, incumbents may feel their licenses should protect not only their spectrum
rights, but their right to certain market dominance as well. See id. at 158.
215 Id. at 161.
216 See Mobile Spectrum Holdings, supra note 207, at para. 71 (noting that the amount of
spectrum available for auction depends on “suitability,” which is partially determined by the
availability of compatible equipment technology).
217 See In the Matter of Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions
With Respect to Mobile Wireless, Including Commercial Mobile Services, Seventeenth
Report, WT Docket No. 13-135 at para. 135 (Dec. 18, 2014) (acknowledging the industrywide price cuts for certain data tiers among all four nationwide wireless service providers).
213
214

2015]

Overestimating Wireless Demand

337

Countervailing influences and the tendency towards “self fulfillment” of
projections are not dominant. Projections used by policy makers seem, on the
whole, to exceed actual demand results, despite factors that may help shape
demand to meet projections. Policymakers may have legitimate reasons for
wishing to stimulate wireless demand, such as increasing overall social welfare, but the appropriate manner to do this would be through transparent processes, not through adoption of flawed demand projections to justify policy
decisions.
IV. METHODS TO MITIGATE BIAS
The issue of biased estimates is common in many industries, such as transportation and supply chain planning.218 Inaccurate traffic estimates are particularly well documented in the area of government-funded transportation infrastructure projects such as roads and rail.219 In many of these projects, costs are
underestimated while benefits are overestimated.220 This may, in part, be due to
the political nature of many transportation funding debates, a process not unlike that seen in spectrum policy debates.221 In order to garner support for an
infrastructure project, it is often necessary to illustrate dramatic beneficial results.222 At the same time, many of these projects have long timeframes for
planning and buildout,223 delaying the process of comparing impacts against
initial and interim predictions. By this time, the analysts who issued these reports, or politicians that utilized them to advance a project, may be in other
positions where they are unlikely to be affected by the inaccuracy.224

218 See Soora Rasouli & Harry J.P. Timmermans, Uncertainty in Travel Demand Forecasting Models: Literature Review and Research Agenda, 4 TRANSP. LETTERS: INT’L J.
TRANSP. RES. 55, 56 (2012) (identifying the bias in “travel surveys”); Anshuman Gupta &
Costas D. Maranas, Managing Demand Uncertainty in Supply Chain Planning, 27 COMPUTERS & CHEM. ENG’G 1219 (2003).
219 See Flyvbjerg, supra note 200, at 6 (noting that in transportation projects “[m]ore
often than not, the information that managers use to decide whether to invest in new projects
is highly inaccurate and biased, making projects highly risky,” and that “transportation projects are no worse than other project types in this respect”).
220 See Bent Flyvbjerg, Policy and Planning for Large Infrastructure Projects: Problems, Causes, Cures 2 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3781, 2005),
available at http://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6521546.pdf.
221 Rasouli & Timmermans, supra note 218 (noting that uncertainty is present in numerous fields, and becomes particularly relevant when, among other factors, a strong political
division exists and financial risks are high).
222 Flyvbjerg, supra note 200, at 13.
223 See Flyvbjerg, supra note 220, at 1,7 (noting that large infrastructure project have
long planning horizons and long construction periods, and are also typically delayed).
224 See Flyvbjerg, supra note 200, at 13.

338

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

[Vol. 23

Attempts in other industries to mitigate similar issues suggest a path forward
for spectrum policy as well. 225 Planners have developed several tools and
methods that help mitigate bias in estimates.226 One well-known example of an
industry attempting to tackle biases in estimates and projections was when the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission brought enforcement action against
ten Wall Street brokerage firms in 2002-2003.227 Regulators were concerned
that Wall Street research analysts were producing overly optimistic estimates
to curry favor with investment banking clients, and developed a set of rules
that may benefit spectrum planners as well.228
A. Improving Forecasting Processes
The American Planning Association, based on the results of a 2005 study of
inaccuracies of demand forecasts for public works projects, endorsed a new
forecast method called “reference class forecasting.”229 Conventional forecasting takes an insider’s perspective, relying on industry-specific knowledge and
processes.230 The idea behind reference class forecasting is to take the “outside
view” of the events being forecast based on the results of similar projects.231 In
particular, reference class forecasting considers the distribution of the accuracy
of prior projections from similar events.232 It then evaluates and “de-biases”
the initial results of the subject by overlaying average error ranges found in the
earlier reference projections.233 By these means, the method reduces optimism
bias and reduces psychological, political, and organizational pressures.234 Experimental evidence has shown that this process produces better results than
conventional methods.235
Spectrum managers might also benefit from such a method. However, one
challenge of using reference class forecasting in a rapidly changing industry,
such as wireless communications, is that the factors underlying forecasting
225 See, e.g., Gupta & Maranas, supra note 218, at 1226 (incorporating demand uncertainty into supply chain management).
226 See, e.g., id. at 1220 (outlining a framework for incorporating uncertainty about demand in supply chain programming).
227 SEC Fact Sheet on Global Analyst Research Settlements, U.S. SEC. EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/factsheet.htm (last updated Apr. 28, 2003).
228 Id.
229 Flyvbjerg, supra note 200.
230 See id. (comparing to reference class forecasting which has an “outside view”).
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 8.
234 Id. at 7.
235 Dan Lovallo & Daniel Kahneman, Delusions of Success: How Optimism Undermines
Executives’ Decisions, HARV. BUS. REV., July 2003, at 56, 61.
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errors can change over time.236 In one case it might be price changes by carriers; in another, changes in the rate of Wi-Fi offloading; and in a third, miscalculations about the impact of new applications.237 As a result, the errors of the
past might not be relevant for understanding the errors in the current subject
forecasts. In addition, other than historical demand for telephony and wireline
broadband, which developed in significantly different regulatory and technological environments, it is difficult to identify relevant reference classes for
wireless broadband.
Nonetheless, reference call forecasting might be useful in identifying potential psychological, political, and organizational biases in forecasts. At minimum, considering historical errors alongside current forecasts can give users a
better idea about the likely accuracy of forecasts.238 In the case of spectrum
demand forecasts, this would mean including other, similar projections in
analyses, especially those conducted by external parties.239 Analysts would be
free to explain differences in their methodologies that might make their analysis more accurate, but including this information would give users a much better appreciation of the likely limits of the forecast they are reading.
B. Increased Transparency
Spectrum demand estimates also suffer from a lack of methodological transparency. As noted above, industry associations and companies often do not
disclose sources or methods for competitive reasons.240 Cisco, in addition, removes from easy access prior estimates when it releases new versions of its
VNI report.241 This hinders people from evaluating the accuracy of projections
in the prior report and considering them in the context of and against changes
in methodology in the current report. Moreover, Cisco, like Worldcom, is

236 For example, the Apple App Store had grown to 1 million apps and more than 60
billion total downloads in late 2013, just five years after launch. See Nathan Ingraham, Apple announces 1 million apps in the App Store, more than 1 billion songs played on iTunes
radio, THE VERGE (Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.theverge.com/2013/10/22/4866302/appleannounces-1-million-apps-in-the-app-store.
237 For example, in 2013 Cisco cited the implementation of tiered mobile data packages,
a slowdown in new mobile-connected laptop growth, and increases in offloading, in lowering previous year traffic estimates. See generally CISCO, supra note 89.
238 Flyvbjerg, supra note 200, at 9.
239 Id.
240 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 19, at 16-17.
241 For example, as of the time of publication, only the most recent VNI report was posted online at Cisco’s VNI website. See CISCO, supra note 14, at 39-40.

340

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

[Vol. 23

uniquely positioned within its industry and may be able to lend additional credibility to its reports by maintaining their proprietary nature.242
Other industries use historical “batting averages” to evaluate the claims of
forecasters.243 One example, as mentioned above, is 2002-2003 governmentled reforms in the financial sector when regulators became concerned that Wall
Street research analysts were publishing biased research that inflated company
prospects.244 In particular, regulators found that Wall Street research analysts at
brokerage firms had inflated the prospects of the companies they followed.245
This put investors at risk.246 Part of the resulting global settlement the major
brokerage firms entered into with the government was to require each research
report to contain a graphic of the history of the firm’s recommendations for
that company’s stock.247 In this way, investors could evaluate the recommendation in context with the analyst’s “track record.”248
It is difficult to measure whether or not the inclusion of a prior forecasts’
track record helps improve accuracy of forecasts. However, it provides the user
with some context about the historical reliability of the projections.249 Such
information should not be difficult for a spectrum analyst to provide and could
be helpful to policy users of the information.
C. Accountability
Another method for improving reliability of data (as well as to address a
multitude of other issues) is to make specific individuals accountable for the
accuracy of their reports. In the case of spectrum demand projections, they are
often published without individual author names, so that a reader has little idea
who conducted the analysis or signed off on results.250 Thus an analyst has little

Sidak, supra note 58.
See SEC Fact Sheet on Global Analyst Research Settlements, supra note 227 (noting
that “[a]n analyst’s compensation will be based in significant part on the quality and accuracy of the analyst’s research”).
244 Gretchen Morgenson, Wall Street’s Analysis Put on the Defensive at a Hearing, N.Y.
TIMES, June 14, 2001, at C4.
245 See SEC Fact Sheet on Global Analyst Research Settlements, supra note 227.
246 Morgenson, supra note 244.
247 See SEC Fact Sheet on Global Analyst Research Settlements, supra note 227 (“Each
quarter, each firm will publish on its website a chart showing its analysts’ performance.”).
248 See id. (setting out the requirements of the analyst’s “track record”).
249 See id.
250 See, e.g., CISCO 2010-2015, supra note 149, at 1 (noting the lack of named authors);
see, e.g., CISCO, supra note 89, at 1 (noting the lack of named authors); see, e.g., CISCO,
supra note 100, at 1 (noting the lack of named authors); see, e.g., CISCO, supra note 14, at 1
(noting the lack of named authors).
242
243
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fear of being “caught” or called out if their projections are widely off the
mark.251
Standard procedure in many areas of finance is to require analysts to sign
reports indicating that their contents reflect the analyst’s views.252 Some analysts are also required to attest that they met various standards of independence
and followed certain professional standards in developing estimates.253 Analyst
accountability does not guarantee accuracy.254 However, without accountability, as is currently the standard with spectrum demand forecasts, the odds for
negligence or abuse increase.
D. Avoid Conflicts of Interest
Many industries have processes and procedures for avoiding conflicts of interest.255 The separation of the business and journalism sides of newspaper organizations,256 and the tenure system for academics257 are probably among the
best-known examples of attempting to assure independence from conflicts of
interest within an organization. Similarly, the government’s settlement with
Wall Street brokerage firms in 2003 limited the ability of firms to pay analysts
based on investment banking revenue.258 However, it can be difficult to ensure
the independence of analysts when a firm’s business is so deeply involved in
specific, esoteric industry issues.259 A firms’ likely response, even if this could
Flyvbjerg, supra note 200, at 13.
See THE APPRAISAL FOUND., APPRAISAL STANDARDS BD., UNIVERSAL STANDARDS OF
PROFESSIONAL APPRAISAL PRACTICE U-84 (2014-2015 ed. 2014), available at
www.uspsp.org. Also note the attestation requirement for Wall Street research analysts
(“Regulation AC”). Responses to Frequently Asked Questions Concerning Regulation Analyst Certification, U.S. SEC. EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Apr. 16, 2005),
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mregacfaq0803.htm.
253 See Responses to Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 252 (discussing Regulation
AC’s analyst requirements).
254 See Brad M. Barber et al., Comparing the Stock Recommendation Performance of
Investment Banks and Independent Research Firms, 85 J. OF FIN. ECON. 490, 516 (2007)
(providing that analysts at investment banks and independent research firms are inconsistent
in terms of accuracy when it comes to buy/sell/hold recommendations by the analysts in
times of close regulatory scrutiny).
255 See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof’l Responsibility R. 1.7 (1983).
256 See, e.g., Statement of Ethical Principles, ASSOCIATED PRESS MEDIA EDITORS
http://www.apme.com/?page=EthicsStatement (last visited Mar. 7, 2015) (“Advertising
should be differentiated from news…[the newspaper] should not give favored news treatment to advertisers or special-interest groups.”).
257 See 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, AM. ASS’N OF
UNIV. PROFESSORS, http://aaup.org/report/1940-statement-principles-academic-freedom-andtenure (last visited Mar. 7, 2015) (describing the “academic freedom” of teacher tenure).
258 See SEC Fact Sheet on Global Analyst Research Settlements, supra note 227.
259 Lori Richards, Director, Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, Sec.
251
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be effectively done, would be to only hire analysts whose views tend towards
the far end of the range that supports their goals.
Even before the Wall Street brokerage settlement, analysts covering brokerage stocks did not make recommendations on their own firm’s stock.260 This
was seen an insurmountable conflict of interest.261 The best way of insulating
from conflicts of interest is to ensure they arise outside of self-interested
firms.262 Thus, projections from independent research firms are likely to be
less susceptible to bias,263 and governments should rely primarily on such estimates in developing national spectrum policy. As FCC Commissioner Copps
said regarding using Internet traffic growth estimates from regulated carriers,
“We must commit to doing the hard work of collecting our own data rather
than relying on potentially misleading and harmful financial, accounting, and
market information produced by corporate sources subject to clear biases and
market pressures.”264
V. POLICY ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. Reducing the Need to Use Unreliable Projections
In addition to more general process changes to mitigate bias, several alterations to how spectrum policy itself is conducted may reduce the need to rely on
demand projections. In particular, in the face of rapidly evolving wireless technology and uncertain, unreliable estimates, spectrum regulators should maxim-

and Exch. Comm’n, Speech to the Financial Women’s Association: Analysts Conflicts of
Interest: Taking Steps to Remove Bias (May 8, 2002) (transcript available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch559.htm) (citing a variety of undisclosed factors that
the SEC believe affect the independence of analysts).
260 Based on co-author J. Armand Musey’s experience working as a senior research analyst at several major Wall Street securities firms during this time period.
261 See, e.g., Jessica Menton, Regulators Fail to Police Conflicts of Interest Among Wall
Street Analysts, Study Says, INT’L BUS. TIMES, (Nov. 10, 2014, 3:41 PM),
http://www.ibtimes.com/regulators-fail-police-conflicts-interest-among-wall-street-analystsstudy-says-172151 (citing the case of Jenifer Jordan, who was fined for non-disclosure of a
new job offer by the company who was subject to her reports).
262 See Richards, supra note 259 (“The rules prohibit research analysts from being supervised by the investment banking department…[a]nalysts will also be prohibited from
sharing draft research reports with target companies.”).
263 Barber et al., supra note 254.
264 Statement of Michael J. Copps, supra note 206.
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ize flexibility to adjust rules and uses, to ensure timely and proportional adjustments to allocations in the face of novel developments.265
First, since wireless clearings are so expensive and time-consuming, there is
strong pressure to begin reallocation procedures as soon as possible.266 However, demand also changes rapidly, so regulators should build into spectrum policy a regular and periodic process for re-evaluating spectrum inventory and
needs. This would involve closely examining trends in network technology,
infrastructure deployments, and auction revenue to re-estimate the need and
utility of additional clearing, rather than automatically assuming unlimited
growth in demand.
Second, there is significant uncertainty about future application growth and
traffic management. In particular, there is no consensus about how many applications will truly require the extremely high quality of service of licensed spectrum;267 in real-world measurements, Wi-Fi continues to offer superior speeds
over 3G and 4G wireless, and is more easily able to support key uses such as
high-definition video streaming.268 In the face of this uncertainty, regulators
should take a default position of favoring shared spectrum bands—including
unlicensed bands—requiring minimal incumbent relocation. Unlicensed bands,
for instance, make licensed spectrum more valuable (offloading peak demand
being just one example), facilitate diversity of applications, lower barriers to
entry, and provide the government consistent long-term revenue (from unlicensed device and service innovation and sales tax) over the one-time proceeds
provided by an auction.269 Regulators have taken note of these factors. In its
2012 spectrum report, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and
Technology (“PCAST”) argued that spectrum sharing is the best (and in many
cases, the only viable) method to allow greater overall utilization of federal
spectrum.270 The U.S. government currently has more than 1500 MHz of spectrum under investigation for repurposing, with a heavy emphasis on commer265 See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 11, at 7,
21, 26, 32-33 (suggesting the Commission’s need to promote spectrum allocation flexibility).
266 See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 3, at 79 (noting that historically it has taken
6 to 13 years to reallocate spectrum, from first step to availability for use).
267 See Michael J. Marcus, Spectrum Policy for Radio Spectrum Access, 100 PROC. OF
THE IEEE 1685, 1689-90 (2012) (noting that the “most rapidly growing sector of wireless
use is not voice telephony with its strict latency requirements and constant throughput, but
asymmetric data flows with widely varying rates”).
268 See
U.S.
Wi-Fi
Report,
OPENSIGNAL
(July
2014),
http://opensignal.com/reports/2014/us-wifi/ (comparing download speeds of Wi-Fi vs. 3G
and 4G).
269 See Werbach & Mehta, supra note 59 (detailing the benefits of shared spectrum).
270 PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 75, at vi-vii.
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cial-federal sharing, including some bands featuring unlicensed or general access usage rules.271
Third, regulators should immediately begin imposing stronger and more robust receiver standards on wireless devices, including more capable antennas
and strong interference acceptance standards. This reduces interference issues
that complicate repurposing of bands by minimizing the likelihood that adjacent users will be harmed by new types or patterns of interference.272 Embedding advanced computational capacity into receivers would also facilitate subsequent changes to spectrum allocations, since wider-range antennas with advanced sensing and software capabilities can more easily share frequencies or
relocate to adjacent bands.273
Fourth, to avoid the risks of spectrum allocation rules being overturned for
being arbitrary and capricious, regulators are required to engage in “substantial
inquiry” during rule-making processes.274 The “presumption of regularity” cannot be used to prevent a “thorough, probing, in-depth review.”275 It is not clear
whether basing a rulemaking on estimates that have proven inaccurate and
have not been updated, meets this standard.276 Continuing reliance on such
forecasts raises particular concerns due to the financial impact of spectrum
allocation decisions.277 Moreover, agencies are required to justify their rulemaking.278 It is not clear that a justification based on such unreliable projections
would be a sufficient agency defense, even under the Chevron standard of

U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, supra note 124, at 6 (Table 2-1).
See U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, NAT’L TELECOMMS. AND INFO. ADMIN., REPORT 03-404
RECEIVER SPECTRUM STANDARDS PHASE 1 – SUMMARY OF RESEARCH INTO EXISTING STANDARDS iv (2003), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntiareport03404.pdf (providing that the FCC is considering such receiver standards and that the NTIA
has receiver standards in place for federal users); see also MARK MACCARTHY, ASPEN INST.,
RETHINKING SPECTRUM POLICY: A FIBER INTENSIVE WIRELESS ARCHITECTURE 2 (2010),
available
at
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/pubs/Rethinking_Spectrum_Po
licy.pdf (stating that there is a role for the FCC to play as a regulator in the development of
minimum receiver standards).
273 See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 75, at 31, 32
(noting new technologies that enable more dynamic, flexible spectrum sharing).
274 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971).
275 Id.
276 See id. (laying out the standard).
277 See
Auction
Summary,
FCC,
http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=auctions_all (last visited Apr. 10, 2014)
(noting net bids of more than $120 billion since the FCC began auctioning spectrum licenses)
278 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012).
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agency deference.279 Even if rules based on unreliable forecasts withstand
challenges, they risk undermining the perceived credibility of agencies using
them.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Over time, government agencies may reduce their need for demand projections by facilitating more flexibility in spectrum bands. Currently, though, policymakers have little choice but to rely on some sort of projections of spectrum
demand. Moreover, regardless of the exact demand, mobile broadband is growing, and political pressure to allocate more spectrum to MNOs is overwhelming. This reliance on projections is unlikely to completely disappear. Spectrum
is limited and in high demand, so it must be allocated; this requires empirical
input.
Government agencies, however, have a strong obligation to manage spectrum as efficiently as possible due to its finite, limited nature and public ownership. It is not just reasonable, but should be standard practice, for policymakers to use the best projections possible, to insist on high standards from those
whose estimates they use, and to properly incorporate uncertainty and risk into
their policy decisions. The current system falls far short of that goal, in our
view. To the extent policymakers do not have confidence in projections, they
should be more up-front about potential biases and errors and periodically reassess their decisions. This, in turn, requires governments to take measures to
improve the quality of the forecasts they commission. Requiring outside experts to be transparent about data and method, to use and publish sensitivity
analyses, to identify potential sources of error, to minimize conflicts of interest, and to avoid establishing a single projection as “fact” when it is known to
be subject to uncertainty, are minimum first steps.

279 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
866 (1984).

